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SUMMARY 
The use of alternative decision models for farm-
er decision-making under uncertainty is demon-
strated in this study. Particular emphasis is giv-
en to game theoretic models. These models have 
previously had little empirical application to farm-
er decision problems. This study has shown, how-
ever, that the models suggest plans which farmers 
in various problem settings may wish to follow. 
Research and extension personnel may want to 
use the models to derive farmer recommendations. 
Farmers must make decisions in their given, un-
certain environment. How are these decisions to 
be made so that the plans resulting will, as nearly 
as possible, have the outcomes desired by the 
farmer? This question expresses the problem this 
study was designed to investigate. Farmers can 
follow any of several models specifying how to 
plan under uncertainty. They may apply the 
models to their own problems directly or follow 
recommendations based on the models. Research 
and extension personnel influence choice of deci-
sion models through data and recommendations. 
Research workers must use some choice mechan-
ism to derive recommendations. Published data 
may influence choice of decision models, by being 
suitable for use in only one or a few models. 
Farmers' abilities to plan rationally may be in-
creased by providing a variety of recommenda-
tions based on different decision models giving 
plans with outcomes desired by farmers. Abilities 
also may be increased by providing data applica-
ble to several decision models. 
The objectives of this study were to explain 
possible applications of game theoretic models to 
agricultural data of the kind used by farmers to 
make decisions, or used by research and extension 
specialists to make recommendations for farmers. 
Farmers differ in their aversion to uncertainty 
and in their ability to withstand the consequences 
of uncertainty and variations in economic out-
comes. Given the same data, different farmers 
may wish to make different plans, depending on 
their capital and equity position or their family 
responsibilities. The several decision or game 
theoretic models applied to agricultural data to de-
termine the choice of practices which might be 
specified to meet various farmer settings include 
the Wald, Laplace, Savage regret and Hurwicz 
criterion models and a conventional probability 
model. 
Of the several models or criteria for decision-
making under uncertainty, only the model for 
maximizing expected utilities, the game theoretic 
models, the naive or econometric models and vari-
ous precautions for uncertainty provide an objec-
tive rule for obtaining an implicit or explicit goal. 
They are normative models. Positive models, 
which describe how individuals mayor do choose 
under uncertainty. have been suggested. These 
models do not lend themselves to application in a 
study such as this because they require subjective 
choices which can only be made by the decision 
maker. The normative models can be applied to 
empirical problems by a research worker. The de-
cision maker may then select the recommendation 
which fits his problem setting. 
The game theoretic models have resulted from 
a special formulation of game theory - games 
against nature. The knowledge situation assumed 
in a game against nature is absolute uncertainty. 
Farmer problems may be thought of as a game 
against nature if a farmer's alternatives are re-
garded as his strategies and if possible states of 
uncontrollable and unpredictable events are treat-
ed as nature's strategies. The game theoretic 
models are techniques for obtaining solutions to 
the game against nature. The Wald criterion calls 
for selecting a plan which allows the greatest min-
imum return, regardless of which state of nature 
occurs. The Savage regret criterion selects a plan 
which minimizes the opportunity cost of choosing 
a less profitable plan, viewed ex post. The Hurwicz 
criterion chooses a plan which has the highest pes-
simism-optimism index. The Laplace criterion 
chooses the plan which has the highest average 
over states of nature. Each of the alternative de-
cision models implies certain goals for the deci-
sion maker. 
Actual farmer problems were considered to 
demonstrate techniques of using models and to 
show the kinds of recommendations which may 
result. The 17 problems considered were a partic-
ular class of within-farm and within-enterprise 
problems. They included situations requiring 
choice of crop varieties, kinds and amounts of fer-
tilizer, crop enterprises, pasture mixtures and 
stocking rates. Data were obtained from annual 
progress reports on Iowa Experiment Station ex-
perimental farms. Thus, this study demonstrated 
that presently available experimental data may be 
used in various decision models. A limitation of 
this study was that the length of data series waS 
relatively short. Therefore, the sets of states of 
nature considered were small. Ideally, this set 
should include many states of nature. 
Actual problem solutions suggested by the al-
ternative decision models frequently differed. For 
example, in one problem, farmer alternatives were 
varieties of oats for planting in northeast Iowa. 
States of nature were the different years in which 
oat yields had been observed. The Laplace solu-
tion called for planting Clarion oats to maximize 
long-run yields. The Wald solution suggested 
planting 56 percent of oat land to Clintland oats 
and 44 percent to Sauk. This plan assured a mini-
mum oat yield which was 5 bushels higher than 
any other plan. Regret was minimized by planting 
25 percent Clintland, 66 percent Clarion and 9 per-
cent Sauk. Major differences between these plans 
are evident. 
The Wald and Laplace solutions were the same 
in 8 of 17 problems. Thus, even though a re-
searcher may frequently be required to recom-
mend a number of plans to fit different problem 
settings, he can sometimes make one recommenda-
tion suitable to a range of problem settings. This 
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result cannot be generalized, however, because the 
problem setting differs greatly among farmers. 
A comparison of the Wald, Savage regret and 
Laplace problem solutions showed that the Savage 
criterion plan had the second highest security 
level in 14 of 17 problems. It had the second high-
est average in 9 problems and third highest in 8 
problems. Thus, for the problems considered, the 
Savage regret criterion appeared to give plans in-
termediate between those for maximizing long-
run profit and those assuring a minimum return 
in the short run. This conclusion is given weight 
by the fact that the Savage regret criterion plan 
had the second highest possible maximum in 11 
of 17 problems. 
As expected, the Hurwicz criterion plan, with a 
range of 0: including zero, had the highest maxi-
mum in a1117 problems. The Laplace tied with the 
Hurwicz criterion for highest maximum 8 times 
in 17 problems. The Wald criterion plan had the 
lowest maximum in 10 of 17 problems. Thus, in 
the problems considered, use of the Wald plan 
would require giving up the opportunity for the 
highest possible return a majority of the time. 
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Regret was always minimized by using the 
Savage regret plan. No other criterion even tied 
with the Savage regret plan in that category. 
Thus, the Savage regret criterion was demon-
strated to be unique among the criteria for obtain-
ing minimum regret. It is theoretically possible to 
obtain a plan which minimizes regret with other 
criteria. 
This study has demonstrated that application of 
several decision models to agricultural problems 
can result in recommendations suited to a wide 
range of farmer situations. The models are me-
chanically easy to apply and are relatively easy to 
understand. The study also demonstrated that 
data representing the influence of many possible 
levels of uncontrollable and unpredictable natural 
variables are needed for application of relevant 
models for decision-making under uncertainty. Re-
search planners should consider the value of ob-
taining data of this kind, perhaps as a supplemen-
tary product of research designed for another pur-
pose. It should be clear that the pUblication of 
data as averages is only one of several data forms 
that may be useful to farmers in decision-making. 
Application of Game Theory Models 
To Decisions on Farm Practices and Resource Use I 
BY ODELL L. WALKER, EARL O. HEADY, LUTHER G. TWEETEN AND JOHN T. PESEK" 
The decision-making function of farmers would 
be greatly simplified in a world free of risk and 
uncertainty. Static economic theory provides 
guides for making decisions when knowledge is 
complete. Resource-use alternatives and the out-
comes of alternative resource combinations are 
specified by physical scientists. Sociologists and 
psychologists provide knowledge on the diversity 
of forces affecting man's activities. Their contrib-
utions lead to economic models which are flexible 
enough to include alternative or multiple goals and 
various resource situations. Together, the various 
disciplines of science provide data and principles 
which would make decision-making a simple proc-
ess if all price, technical and social quantities were 
known with certainty. 
Obviously, the farmer decision-making environ-
ment is more complex than that just described. 
Uncertainty is introduced by technical and tech-
nological change, price variation and unpredictable 
human action. 
Physical scientists cannot predict exactly the 
amount and quality of a product to be obtained 
from given resources. The input of factors such 
as weather and other natural phenomena is not 
known until production has taken place. Often, 
resource inputs are only classified quantitatively, 
and important qualitative properties are not 
stated. These conditions lead to technical un-
certainty in agriculture. 
Technological change is a second source of un-
certainty. Change in production techniques, de-
velopment of new products or inputs and introduc-
tion of other innovations cannot be accurately pre-
dicted, yet they affect the desirability of alterna-
tive farm plans. 
Price provides a third major source of uncer-
tainty. The complex of interrelated factors which 
contribute to price variability includes: (a) world 
and national economic conditions, (b) the general 
state of uncontrollable, natural phenomena affect-
ing production, (c) commodity and business cycle 
1 P~oject 1135 of the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experi-
ment Station . 
• The authors are, respectively: assistant professor in agricultural eco-
nomics at Oklahoma State University (formerly graduate assistant at 
Iowa State University); professor of agricultural economics; r~search 
associate in agricultural economics; Ilnd pl1>fCSSOJ' Ilf ~ils, 
phenomena, (d) governmental policy and (e) in-
dividual values and goals. 
A fourth source of farm uncertainty results 
from relationships among individuals, groups of 
individuals and institutions. Farmers cannot al-
ways predict governmental activities which affect 
future events and, thus, their own welfare. Man's 
goals change; therefore, commitments made be-
tween a farmer and another person in one time 
period may not attain goals which exist in another 
time period. 
This study considers uncertainty the usual en-
vironment for agricultural production. The term 
uncertainty has been used initially to describe a 
general condition of change, imperfect knowledge 
and lack of foresight. A more technical use of the 
term is introduced later. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
. Farmers can follow, even though unwittingly, 
any of several models which specify how to oper-
ate under uncertainty. These alternative decision 
models imply particular psychologies, resource sit-
uations and states of knowledge for individuals 
who use them. Research and extension personnel 
often use, also perhaps unwittingly, the various 
models in making recommendations to farmers. 
The over-all objective of this study is to exam-
ine various game theoretic models which provide a 
relevant framework for assisting farmers to select 
plans appropriate to their personal situation. 
Little attention has previously been given to deter-
mining the appropriateness of the relatively new 
game theoretic techniques for farmer decision-
making under uncertainty. Other models, such as 
those discussed later, are more highly developed 
and better known. Thus, the game theoretic de-
cision criteria are emphasized in this study. This 
emphasis is motivated by need for research to de-
termine the usefulness of the game theoretic cri-
teria. A preliminary hypothesis is that the· cri-
teria have considerable application to farmer de-
cision-making under uncertainty. 
The specific major objectives of this study are: 
(1) To review game theoretic criteria relative 
to farmer decision:-making, to' demonstrate the 
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mechanics of their use and to show their relation-
ship to other decision models. 
(2) To evaluate the game theoretic criteria 
for use as decision models under uncertainty by 
(a) demonstrating the kinds of problem solutions 
which they suggest and (b) determining the type 
of problem settings for which they are appro-
priate. 
(3) To demonstrate the wide range of problem 
settings which farmers logically may have and to 
show the need for recommendations which are 
suited to those settings. 
(4) To demonstrate techniques for formulating 
farmer problems clearly and comprehensively. 
(5) To use experimental data of conventional 
types generally used for making recommendations 
to farmers in a game theoretic framework as a 
bas i s for determining how recommendations 
might best be conditioned to meet the decision-
making environment of different farmers. 
GAME THEORETIC TECHNIQUES 
The decision criteria discussed in this section 
are for use in a knowledge situation characterized 
by uncertainty. They are the only models provid-
ing an objective rule for obtaining an implied or 
explicit goal. Such models are normative rather 
than positive. 
TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES 
Game theoretic techniques are closely related to 
the two-person zero-sum game. Thus, the latter 
models are briefly reviewed. Luce and Raiffa3 and 
Heady and Candler4 provide a complete treatment 
of game theory in this framework. 
Two players or persons oppose each other in . 
this type of game; each has a finite number of 
alternative courses of ,action called a strategy set. 
These sets are designated as: 
Sl = [aI' a2 , ••• ,am] and 
S2 = [bl, b2, ••• , bn ] • 
Sl is the strategy set for Player 1 and is made up 
of m strategies. Player 2 has strategy set S2 com-
posed of n strategies. The rule for the game is 
that each player has only one move (strategy 
choice), and the moves must be taken simultane-
ously or in such a way that neither player knows 
which strategy choice the other is using. Corre-
sponding to each pair of strategies (one selected 
by each player), there is a payoff, Oij. All possible 
pairs of strategies form a matrix of outcomes, 
(Oil)' The Ou (i = 1, ... , m and j = 1, ... ,n) 
entry in this matrix is the outcome of Player 1 
choosing his ith strategy and Player 2 choosing 
his jth strategy. 
What strategy choice should a player make to 
achieve the desired game outcome? Game theory 
does not attempt to say·what he should do. It only 
• Luee, R: D. and Raiffa, H. Games and decisions: introduction and 
critical survey. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York. 1957. 
• Heady" Earl O. and Candler, W. ·V. Linear programming methods. 
Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 1958. 
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points out which strategy a player can use to ob-
tain the highest sure return or the lowest sure 
loss. This is called the "security level." Game 
theory gives procedures for determining the strat-
egy which obtains the security level. The strategy 
may be a "pure strategy" requiring the use of on-
ly one alternative course of action. A "mixed 
strategy" calls for using two or more courses of 
action with given frequencies. This requires re-
peating the game a large number of times. In 
some cases, the strategies may not be mutually 
exclusive, and a mixed strategy may be used in a 
single game. 
Solutions for games with large payoff matrices 
may be obtained by use of the simplex method. 
Heady and Candler5 and others present procedures 
for converting the game into a linear program-
ming problem to be solved by the simplex method. 
The simplex procedure is used for solving empir-
ical problems presented in later sections. 
GAMES AGAINST NATURE 
In this study game theory is applied to "games 
against nature." The problem visualized in a 
game against nature has been outlined by Luce 
and Raiffa6 as: 
A choice must be made from among acts aI' a2, 
.... am but the relative desirability of each act 
depends upon which "state of nature" prevails, 
either 81, 82, ••• Sn' 
States of nature may be weather, disease, insects 
or other natural uncertainties which farmers face. 
The game against nature differs from true games 
in that the natural phenomenon is not necessarily 
a conscious adversary. Nature cannot be said to 
have specific desires or goals which influence how 
it plays the game. 
Corresponding to each farmer act and state of 
nature pair there is an outcome, Oil' All possible 
pairs form a payoff matrix which is the same as 
that described for true games. The problem is to 
choose a farmer strategy which will most nearly 
attain the goals specified for the resources in-
volved. The strategy may be either pure or mixed. 
The knowledge situation for games against nature 
is taken to be complete uncertainty as to which 
state of nature will occur. Several criteria can be 
suggested for use in resolving the decision prob-
lem under uncertainty. Each prescribes an opti-
mal mode of behavior for the decision maker, pro-
viding he has the attributes implied by the cri-
terion. The various criteria are used extensively 
in empirical problems presented later in this study. 
The criteria are discussed on the following pages 
with elaboration on the rules for obtaining solu-
tions, the implications of the criteria and the rela-
tionship of the criteria to other decision models 
for imperfect knowledge situations. 
WALD MAXIMIN CRITERION 
Assume a decision problem under uncertainty 
with acts AI, A 2 , ••• Am and states Sl. S2. . .. SU' 
• Ibid.. Ch. 15. 
• Luee and Ralff ... op. cit., p. 276. 
In using the Wald7 criterion, each act is assigned 
an index which is its security level. For the fol-
lowing problem, 2 is the security level for Al and 
1 is the security level for A2. 
SI S2 
Al [2 3J 
A2 4 1 
The Wald criterion rule is to choose the act with 
the highest index (security level). In the example 
used, Al would be chosen. If a mixed strategy is 
possible for this example, the security level is 
10/4 and the strategy is (3/4Al' 1/4A2).8 
If the AI are farmer strategies and the Sj are 
states of nature, the preceding example may be 
taken as a game in which a farmer is playing 
against nature. The solution rule corresponds ex-
actly to that for a two-person zero-sum game. It 
can be shown that the maximin strategy for a 
two-person zero-sum game is the best strategy 
against the worst an opponent can do. Nature will 
not consciously do its worst against the farmer; 
thus, the Wald criterion is a conservative model 
for decision-making under uncertainty. 
Few farmers believe that nature is trying to do 
its worst to them. Many farmers, however, may 
give serious thought to the consequences which 
could result if the worst possible state of nature 
were to occur. The characteristics of such farm-
ers are discussed later. It is instructive, however, 
to mention a few such attributes in this section to 
show that the Wald criterion may be a useful mod-
el for farmer decision-making under uncertainty. 
A farmer with severely limiting resources might 
be forced out of business if a very unfavorable 
outcome occurs. The payoff which the Wald cri-
terion assures, however, may be sufficient to pre-
vent loss of a magnitude that the farmer cannot 
continue farming. In this case, the farmer prob-
ably would be willing to follow a plan suggested 
by the Wald criterion. Family responsibilities and 
dislike for chance-taking also may cause a Wald 
solution to be preferable. 
In a problem requiring choice of alternative 
crops, a Wald mixed strategy would call for grow-
ing several crops to insure the highest security 
level.9 This is equivalent to diversification to in-
T Wald, A. Statistical decision functions. John Wiley and Sons, Inc .. 
New York. 1950. 
• Using the above matrix, a procedure for finding the mixed strategy 
and the security level L i. as follows: Assume that the Ai'. are farm-
er acts and the Sj's are states of nature. The farmer wishes to use a 
strategy which will assure him at least a gain of L, regardless of the 
strategy used by nature. Let p be the frequency with which the fanner 
plays A. and (1-p) the frequency with which he plays A.. If nature 
plaYS only S., the gain to the farmer is 
(a) 2 p + 4 (1-p), 
If nature plays only S., the gain to the farmer is 
(b) 3 p + (1-p). 
Since the farmer wishes to obtain a minimum gain L whether nature 
plaYS either S, Or 52, we equate (a) and (b) and solve for p. The solu-
tion is p = 3/4: thUll 1-p = 114. The strategy of the farmer is 3/4 A, 
and 1/4 A •. The security level L maY be computed from (a) or (b). 
From (a) it is 2 (3/4) + 4 (114) = 10/4. This procedure Is practical 
only in simple games. The principles, however, remain the Bame when 
more sophisticated procedures are used. 
• The security level is the mimimum gain to the farmer (loss to nature). 
The farmer is assured of this gain even if nature does Its worst. If 
nature doe. not do its worst, the gain to the farmer may be greater 
than the security level. The "gain" may be income, yield per acre or 
pounds per animal, for .. xample. 
sure a minimum income level each year. The Wald 
solution also may call for diversifying practices, 
such as crop varieties or amounts of fertilizer, 
rather than using a single variety or fertilization 
level which might average highest in profit over a 
series of years. In appropriate problems, the Wald 
criterion may indicate that a practice such as con~ 
tracting for purchases or sales allows the highest 
security level. 
SAVAGE REGRET CRITERION 
The Savage 10 regret criterion is suggested as a 
method of analysis for the following decision prob-
lem under uncertainty: 
Sl S 
!: e! :~J 
If SI is the true state of nature, the decision mak~ 
er will have no "regret'" if he chooses Al but will 
have regret if he chooses A 2 • If S2 is the true 
state, he will have regret if he chooses Al but will 
not if he chooses A2• For this type of problem, we 
can define a (negative) regret matrix (V\j) by 
forming the elements: 
VII = Olj - Max Okj 
k 
That is, form a new matrix (VIj) by subtract~ 
ing the maximum outcome in each column from 
each outcome in that column. This matrix, form-
ed by use of the rule and the above example, is 
as follows: 
SI S. 
!: r-~ ~J 
Each entry, Vlj, in this matrix measures the dif-
ference between the payoff which actually is ob-
tained and the payoff which could have been ob-
tained if the true state of nature had been known. 
The Wald solution rule is applied to the regret 
matrix to determine the strategy and the regret 
security level. For the preceding example, a pure 
strategy calls for use of A 2, and the security level 
is 1. If a mixed strategy is allowed, the maximum 
regret may be reduced to 5/6. 
The Savage criterion, like the Hurwicz and Lap-
lace criteria to be discussed, is not entirely sug-
gested by game theory, with which it is associated. 
Elements of game theory are used only in setting 
up the problem and in obtaining a solution after 
the regret matrix is formed. The criterion implies 
a fundamental assumption about the way individ-
uals plan under uncertainty. It assumes that they 
actually try to minimize regret. No empirical evi-
dence is available to verify or reject this assump-
tion. Nevertheless, some plans suggested by the 
•• Savage, .L, J. The theory of statistical decillion. Jour. Amer. Stat. 
Assn. 46: 55-57. 1951, 
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criterion are similar to plans actually followed 
by farmers. 
Exainples can be constructed in which farmers 
would not follow the Savage regret solution. For 
example assume that the payoffs in the following 
example' are dollar payoffs above va;riable costs 




Consider a farmer situation where returns a~ove 
variable costs must be $18 or more to pay fIxed 
costs and pay for family living. If.these expe~se.s 
are not paid the farmer will be m severe dIffI-
culty. In su~h a situation,- the possible $1 regret 
from choosing A2 may be more important than 
the possible $5 regret from choosing At. Thus,. the 
Savage regret criterion would not be appropnate. 
Other examples could be constructed where ~he 
Savage criterion is quite appropriate. It may gIve 
solutions similar to those suggested by a precau-
tion for uncertainty such as insurance. Consider 




Do not insure Al 
Insure 
The minimum payoff in row Al of the regret 
matrix is -4,985 and in row A2 , -15. Thus, the 
farmer would insure if he follows the Savage re-
gret criterion. Similar examples would show that 
a Savage solution calls for liquidity and flexibility. 
The Savage regret criterion yields a more con-
servative solution if mixed strategies are allowed. 
All weight then is not placed on the one highest 
regret. Some importance is attached to lower pos-
sible regret. In the following problem, a strategy 
of (1/6Ah 5/6A2) allows a lower maximum regret 
and a higher security level in terms of dollar re-




The minimum regret with a mixed strategy is 
5/6 compared with a regret of 1 if A2 is used ex-
clusively. In addition, a payoff level of 17.2, 
rather than 17, is assured. 
.: _' ~URWICZ CRITERION 
-The -Hurwiczll criterion can be used to examine 
"Hurwlcz. L. Optimality criteria for decision making under ignorance. 
Cowles Commission Dlscllll8ion' Paper, Statistics, No. 350. 1951: (Mimeo.) 
~18{ 
the state of nature having the best consequen~e 
and the state having the worst consequence m 
each row. For act AI, let ml be the minimum and 
MI the maximum of the outcomes in that row. Let 
a fixed number, 0:, (0 < 0: < 1) represent a 
given individual's pessimism index that the sta~e 
giving ml will occur. Let (1 - 0:) represent hIS 
belief that the state giving MI will occur. An in-
dex for each Ai is then computed as follows: 
0: ml + (1- 0:) Mi = 0: index for AI. 
The act with the highest 0: index is the pref~r­
red act. It is the strategy chosen by the HUrwICZ 
criterion. 
The Hurwicz criterion is an alternative to the 
more conservative Wald criterion. If 0: = 1, the 
Hurwicz criterion gives the same solution as the 
Waldo It places emphasis on both the worst and 
best consequences which can occur if 0: is not 
o or 1. The Hurwicz criterion is not as easily ap-
plied as the other criteria because the 0: must be 
supplied by the decision maker. 
The 0: should not be interpreted as a decision 
maker's evaluation of the likelihood of various 
states of nature occurring. Suppose that a farmer 
has knowledge that Sa, in the following matrix, is 
likely to occur and that S2 is unlikely to occur. 
_S1 S2 Sa 
-
At 1 8 0 
A2 1 0 3 
As 1 0 4 
Assuming 0: = 0.3 for him, he may form the 
index, (0.3) (0) + (1 - 0.3) 3, for A 2• However, 
the index for A1 must be (0.3) (0) + (1 - 0.3) 8. 
This implies that he is more pessimistic about Sa 
occurring than 82, The 0: must be independent 
of states of nature to avoid inconsistency. 
Luce and Raiffat2 suggest a method for deriving 
0: which can be adapted to farm decision-making 
problems. Suppose this payoff matrix: 
S1 S2 
A1 fO xl] 
A2 x 
The ex index for A1 is 
(0) 0: + 1 (1 - 0:) = 1 - 0: • 
The ex index for A2 is 
x 0: + x (1 - 0:) = X • 
Luce and Raiffa suggest choosing an x such that 
At and A2 are indifferent. The decision maker 
must specify an x such that x = 1 - 0:. If x, a 
sure return must be relatively high, then 0: will 
be relatively small. This procedure may indicate 
a preference for gambling on a higher return. It 
also may represent the situation of a decision 
10 Luce and Ralffa. op. cit .. PP. 282-283. 
maker who must have a high return and who must 
gamble to "stay in the game." If x is, relatively 
low, the relevant case may be a decision 'maker 
who prefers not to gamble. It also maybe char-
acteristic of an individual who needs a particular 
level of return so intensely that he emphasizes it 
above all else. It has been noted previously that 
with 0: = 1, the Hurwicz criterion is the same as 
the Wald pure strategy criterion. This may be in-
terpreted as an extreme case of distaste for gam-
bling or of need for a given level of return. Any of 
these descriptions of individual psychology or re-
source situations characterizes some farmers. 
Thus, the Hurwicz criterion is deemed applicable 
to farmer problems.' . 
LAPLACE CRITERION 
The Laplace13 criterion is based on the "prin-
ciple of insufficient reason." In terms of the prob-
lem considered here, that principle states that if 
one is "completely ignorant'" as to which state of 
nature will occur, then one should behave as if all 
are equally likely. The decision problem under un-
certainty is treated essentially as a risk problem 
with each state being assigned equal probabilities. 
An expected outcome based on these probabilities 
is computed for each AI. The procedure is equiva-
lent to averaging each act across states of nature. 
The act with the highest average is the strategy 
chosen by the Laplace criterion. . 
If enough states of nature are considered; the 
Laplace criterion is the average "naive" model. 
Many recommendations made by research and ex.:. 
tension workers are based on the average model. 
Thus, the Laplace criterion is implicitly used in 
many farming decisions. It is an appropriate 
model if the decision maker can stay in farming 
long enough to realize the average expected .. 
THE FARMER DECISION PROBLEM 
The choice models just outlined suggest a num-
ber of ways of resolving farming decision prob-
lems. Which model should a given farmer select? 
This question can be answered only after a care-
ful analysis of the setting in which the problem is 
framed. This section is devoted primarily to fur-
ther analysis of factors which affect the problem 
setting. 
ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM SETTING COMPONENTS 
The problem setting for decision-making is pro-
vided by these components: (a) the alternative 
courses of action allowed by a particular farmer's 
resource situation and known technology, (b) the 
characteristics of the farmer, including his psy-
chology, family situation and work preference and 
(c) the knowledge situation with respect to states 
of nature and other conditions. It is evident that 
these components are not the same for all farmers. 
"Thrall. R. M.. Coombe. C. H. and DlLvis. R. L.. eels. Decision proc. 
esses. John Wile)' and Sons. Inc., New York 1,967. 
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ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FARMERS 
The alternative courses of action open to a 
farmer depend on his soil and other physical re-
sources, the amount of capital available to him 
and his managerial ability in converting these re-
sources into products. These resource situations 
will differ among farmers. Even for two farmers 
on the same soil type and faced by the same cli-
matic and natural factors, alternatives in plans 
can differ depending on the availability of capital 
and managerial ability. Hence, a common recom-
mendation on resource use or farm practices is 
not equally applicable to all farmers who are faced 
with a similar situation with respect to physical 
resources. 
The goal most often attributed to farmers is 
maximization of returns over a relatively long 
period of time. This is the goal implied by the 
average or "naive" model typically used as the 
basis for recommendations to farmers. But this 
model is not universally appropriate. Some farm-
ers prefer not to maximize profits, but to consume 
a part of their resources directly. For example, 
they may "consume" family labor in the form of 
leisure or vacations; Farmers who have strong 
work preferences tend to choose enterprises or 
practices which involve the tasks they enjoy most. 
Thus;' a farmer may choose dairying even though 
feeding hogs is more profitable. Some enterprises 
provide other forms of satisfaction which lead to 
choice of those enterprises rather than other fea-
sible, ones. Thus, decision models designed to 
maximize money income over time are not ap-
propriate for use of all farmers. 
Various psychological traits of farmers also 
may have considerable influence on decisions. For 
example, the need for or value placed on financial 
security is a trait which varies among farmers. 
This trait affects a farmer's attitude toward 
chance-taking. Some may enjoy taking chances, 
and a high-risk enterprise may be selected because 
of a chance for high profits and for the satisfac-
tion of "playing the game successfully." The psy-
chology of an individual with regard to risk is 
affected by his age, equity position and family 
situation. A young farmer may gamble because 
he has much to gain and few resources to lose. In 
the event of unfavorable outcomes, his age allows 
the opportunity to start over in business. A farm-
er with a large family must provide for their liv-
ing and often is forced to be conservative. A 
farmer with a strong equity position can with-
stand losses in a few years and recover them in 
other years. He can "take greater chances" than 
a farmer with a smaller equity ratio who might be 
forced into bankruptcy with one major setback. 
Renters with short-term leases have uncertain-
ty as to how long they will be on the farm. This 
situation may lead to plans which are not most 
profitable in the long run. A plan may be follow-
ed to assure an acceptable income level each year, 
rather than an acceptable average income over a 
period of years. A conservative farmer may fol-
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low !l plan f?r his main enterprise which assures 
a mmimum mcome level each year. He may use 
a few resources, however, in a risky enterprise 
because he has little to lose and may make a sub-
stantial profit. J:. d~cision required only. once or a few times in 
a hfetIme may be. made qUIte differently than one 
repeated many tImes. A "one-time" decision is 
o~t~n extremely important. For example, an in-
d!v.Idual usually purchases a farm only once. De-
~IsIOns to purchase high-cost machinery or build-
mgs are only made a few times in a lifetime. 
Some fa~me~s could not base plans on an average 
expectatIon If the plans were irrevocable. An un-
favorable outcome might force the farmer into 
severe financial stress or out of business. 
. We have touched upon only a few of the situa-
tIOns and other attributes which affect the psy-
chology of a farmer in making decisions. The 
l1!lmber enumerated is sufficient, however, to in-
dIcate that a standard set of recommendations to 
~1l.far!Tler~, supposing their goal to be profit max-
mllzatIon m the long run, is not equally appropi-
ate or useful to all. 
DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE 
. Degrees of knowledge relevant in decision-mak-
mg range from risk through uncertainty. The de-
g,ree of knowledge varies with enterprises, prac-
tIces, years, contractual arrangements, locations 
and the length of time over which decisions must 
be made. The amount of knowledge possessed by 
a .farme~ a.nd the. degree of certainty surrounding 
hIS predICtIons WIll determine the decision-making 
procedure which is most appropriate. But the de-
gree of knowledge is no less important than the 
psy.c~ology of the ~a~er in indicating the type of 
deCISIOn model whIch IS most appropriate for the 
particular situation. 
The farmer must predict possible outcomes to 
make a decision which fits his individual situation 
and psychological setting. He must predict not 
only the average outcome but also minimum out-
comes, as well as other values of the distribution. 
The necessity for considering the various possi-
ble outcomes (I.e. a probability distribution even 
though it is held in rough subjective manner) is 
to estimate the "state of nature" and the "possi-
ble strategies which can be used by nature." For 
exampl~, c~op yield data from experiments con-
ducted m dIfferent years would be considered out-
comes of different states of nature although they 
may possibly result from the sam'e course of ac-
tion (e.g., fertilizers, cultural practices, etc.). The 
suggested problem formulation indicates that data 
should reflect the effects of many states of nature. 
Once the matrix of outcomes is determined the 
farmer may reduce its column magnitude by de-
ciding. that. his predictive powers are adequate to 
allow IgnorIl}g some possible conditions. That is, 
he ma~ deCIde that some states of nature (co-
lumns m the l?ayoff matrix) are not important 
~nou.gh to conSIder. He may be confident enough 
llY. hIS knowledge to attach probabilities to condi-
tIons and treat the problem as one of risk. This 
!iS6 
decision may vary among farmers. It depends on 
a person's SUbjective interpretation of the knowl-
edge situa~ion and his ability to withstand the ef-
. fe~ts of bemg wrong. Various techniques for han-
dlmg the set of conditions for particular problems 
are discussed in later sections. 
GAME CRITERIA APPLIED TO 
AGRICULTURAL DATA 
G~me th~oretical models have been outlined as 
pOSSIble gUIdes for farmer decision-making. Cir-
cumstances surrounding the decision-making proc-
~ss. of !armers have been reviewed as a basis for 
mdICatmg that a "standard" recommendation can-
not conform equally well to the situation of all 
farmer~. ~e ~ow turn. to applications of game 
t!J.eorebc CrIterIa to chOIce of various farm prac-
tices al}d resource uses .. The obj ective here is to 
determme the type of recommendation which may 
be made to farmers when particular O'ame models 
are used, ~o confo!m wi~h the differe~t degrees of 
conservatIsm or rIsk whIch farmers with different 
dec~sion-making environments might employ. The 
baSIC data are drawn mainly from experiments 
conducted over the state by Iowa State Univer-
si~y. It is e~tirely poss.ible that game criteria 
mIght be applled to experImental data by research 
workers before they publish their results and 
make recommendations to farmers. Under this 
procedure, alternative recommendations could be 
made to conform to the decision-making environ-
ment of farmers with different situations with 
respect to capital, equity, aversion to risk or fi-
nancial responsibilities. 
Several typical cropping problems are studied 
first. The first relates to choice of crop varieties. 
Next, the problem of choosing the amount and 
k}nd of fertilizer to use on a given crop is con-
sldered. A problem requiring choice of alternative 
cr?ps is examined .. Finally, problems of pasture 
mlxtures and stockmg rates are examined. The 
problem analysis is designed to achieve several of 
the objectives of this study: (a) It demonstrates 
procedures for applying alternative decision mod-
el.s. (b) The analysis provides examples of the 
kinds of problem solutions that alternative deci-
sion models may suggest. Those solutions then 
may be used to determine the appropriateness of 
the models to various problem settings. (c) Ac-
tual experimental data are used so that the prob-
lem solutions obtained may serve for actual rec-
ommendations to farmers. They also demonstrate 
a wider range of possible recommendations than 
r~search and extension personnel normally con-
SIder. (d) The problem analysis indicates the 
kinds of data which are needed for decision-mak-
ing under uncertainty and for application of game 
theoretic models. It further indicates how data 
presently available may be adapted to decision-
making needs. 
CHOICE OF CROP VARIETIES 
Farmers must choose crop varieties each pro-
duction season. Some farmers plant varieties 
which have had satisfactory yields and have dis-
played other desirable characteristics i~ past 
years. The farmer or his neighbors may have had 
actual experience with the variety or varieties 
chosen. Other farmers consult with research and 
extension personnel and review experiment sta-
tion and commercial literature before making a 
choice. 
Research and extension specialists spend con-
siderable time and other resources in evaluating 
crop varieties and presenting variety data and rec-
ommendations to farmers. Usually, several varie-
ties are rated as acceptable because their yields, 
resistance to disease, maturity time, test weight 
and other characteristics meet certain standards. 
Other characteristics being equal, varieties which 
have had the highest average yield over a period 
of years are usually recommended. Thus, the usu-
al recommendations are based on the Laplace cri-
terion. Previous discussion would suggest that all 
farmers may not wish to follow plans suggested 
by this particUlar criterion. 
A variety problem results when one variety 
does not normally out yield all others every year. 
The problem may be stated in terms of the general 
problem formulations presented earlier. Farmer 
acts or alternatives are the. several available va-
rieties. Components of nature--rainfall, insects, 
disease, temperature--may occur in various com-
binations to form a state of nature or production 
condition. Any given year represents such a com-
bination. Thus, each year for which variety data 
are available represents a state of nature. 
Only varieties which are rated as generally ac-
ceptable by the Iowa Experiment Station are con-
sidered. H Characteristics other than yield are 
partially taken into account. The outcome result-
ing from a pair of farmer-nature alternatives is 
measured in bushel yields per acre. All possible 
pairs of farmer and nature alternatives form a 
matrix of outcomes. In game theory terminology, 
the latter is a payoff matrix. Seed costs. for vari-
ous varieties are approximately equal; thus, each 
of the farmer alternatives requires the same re:-
source input. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
choose varieties on the basis of bushels produced 
per acre. The farmer wants to choose varieties 
which will provide a yield pattern and yield level 
best suited to his problem setting. 
Data used in the variety problems were obtained 
from annual progress reports on Iowa experi-
mental farms. It is not possible with the data 
available to determine whether yield differences 
between varieties in a given year are significant. 
A I-bushel yield difference may be shown between 
two varieties in a given year. That difference may 
be due to chance alone and not to true differences 
between the varieties. A refinement of this study 
might include only varieties which are significant-
ly different in at least 1 year. In years where 
their yields are statistically equal, equal yields 
could be used. It can be argued, however, that a 
U Johnson. I. J. and Bragonler. W. H. Crop varieties for 1958. Iowa 
Farm Science 12: 13.16. January 1958. . . ' 
difference at a low level of significance should be 
considered. A farmer may be willing to take ad-
vantage of even a 50-percent chance of getting a 
higher yield from one variety as compared with 
another, particularly-if he has little chance of get-
ting a lower yield. 
As previously indicated, each year of yield data 
is affected by a unique combination of weather, 
disease and insects. New varieties are continually 
being developed. Thus, the period of years cover-
ed by the variety yield data is relatively short. 
The newer, superior varieties have been tested for 
only a few years. The best a farmer can do is use 
the data he has available in making a choice. 
Therefore, he has no way of taking account of 
possible outcomes which could result from other 
states of nature (years). He can only hope that 
the relationship between varieties will not change 
in an unfavorable direction when a different type 
of year is experienced. 
Since one of the objectives of this study is to 
evaluate the alternative decision criteria, meth-
odological comments are made throughout the fol-
lowing discussion. For the most part, such com-
ments are made at the end of the analysis of each 
farmer problem. Methodological observations are 
designed to increase understanding of the decision 
criteria. They also give further insight into the 
types of problem solutions which the criteria sug-
gest. Weaknesses of the criteria as decision-mak.,. 
ing tools are easiest to point out if discussed in 
connection with the analysis of a particular farm-
er problem. . 
CHOICE OF OAT VARIETIES IN NORTHEAST IOWA 
Three early maturing, four mid season maturing 
and one late maturing oat varieties are recom-
mended in Iowa. A farmer may choose from these 
(i.e., he has eight alternatives). Data are avail-
able on four of these varieties grown in Howard 
County (northeast Iowa) during the period 1953-
57. Thus, the farmer knows of five states of na-
ture and has four alternative acts. Table 1 shows 
the farmer-nature payoff matrix for the n'orth-
east Iowa oat variety decision problem. Table 2 
shows the Savage regret matrix for the same 
problem. The Savage regret matrix was obtained 
by subtracting the highest yield under each year 
TABLE 1. FARMER-NATURE PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE HO· 
WARD COUNTY (NORTHEAST IOWA) OAT VARIETY PROBLEM.-
F'armer States of nature (year.) 
alternative.. 1953 1954 1965 1956 
(variety) I:u./a. bu./a. bu./B. bu./a. 
Bonham ...................... 46 66 60 110 
CUntland .................... 49 62 57 97 
Clarion ........................ 45 74 78 111 







- Source of data: Iowa State University. Howard County Experimental 
Farm. Annual progress report. 1951 through 1957. (Mimeo.) Depart. 
ment of Agronomy. Iowa State University. Ames. Iowa. 1952 through 
1958. 
b Sauk was hailed out in 1956. It might be argued that It Is Incorrect to 
count thla lUI a zero yield In comparing this variety with others. How. 
ever. Sauk is a late-maturing variety and thus Is uniquely subjected to 
hail hazard after the other varieties hnve already been h"I'Vested. Some 
farmers may exclude hail fl'om consideration as a possible component 
of states oC nature. They may think that hail I. too improbable for con. 
Cern. They must be prepared. however. to accept the consequences of 
hall if it occurs. 
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TABLE 2. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR HOWARD COUNTY (NORTHEAST IOWA) OAT VARIETY PROBLEM. 
Fanner States of nature (years) 
alternatives 1953 1954 1955. 1956. 1957 
(variety) bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
Bonham ........................ -15 -18 -27 -1 
Clintland •.••.................. -12 -22 -30 -14 
Clarion •••.•..••............... -16 -10 -9 0 






from each other yield in that same year. All out· 
comes are in bushels per acre. ' . ' 
Table 3 indicates the strategies (varieties) 
which result from application of the game theore-
tic decision models. The average model is re-
placed by the Laplace criterion in this example. A 
probability model cannot be used because fre-
quency data for different types of years are not 
available. The Wald solution, a mixed strategy, 
was obtained by converting the game against na-
ture into a linear programming p,roblem. It was 
then solved by the simplex method. According to 
the assumptions of game theory, nature would 
never use its 1954, 1955 and 1957 strategies.15 
Yields of every variety were higher in those years 
than for 1953 and 1956. Thus, assuming, that na-
ture is trying to do its worst to the farmer, it 
would only use its 1953 and 1956 strategies. This 
assumption must be made to use the Wald cri-
terion. Thus, the size of the game matrix is re-
duced when the Wald criterion is considered. 
The Savage regret solution also calls for a mix-
ed strategy. This solution was obtained by use of 
the simplex method. All entries were made great-
er than or equal to zero by adding a constant. This 
step was necessary to use the most convenient 
simplex techniques. The solution is not affected 
by adding a constant, providing the same constant 
is subtracted from the final minimum regret 
solution. 
15 This characteristic of many fanner-nature game matrices Is discussed 
later In this section. .. , .. 
. Th~'; l.apla:c~: s~iution simply indicates the va-
riety that, has~the highest average. The Hurwicz 
solution was obtained by forming the optimism-
pessimism index",discussed in a previous section. 
Then, the resulting equations were solved to de-
terminethe range of 0:: over which various va-
rietiesare optimum. 'It should be noted that a dif-
ferent variety is selected for each range of 0:. 
Table 3 also contains four indications of the 
outcomes which'may result from following various 
strategies. These tend to answer common ques-
tions a decision-maker may ask about a course of 
action. ,For example, he may ask, "What is the 
worst, and best. that can happen ?" or "What aver-
age outcome, niight, be expected if I follow this 
course of action Qver a long period?" The column 
in table a labeled minimum (Min.) shows the 
worst that can ha;ppen. In the case of the Wald 
criterion, it is the security.level derived from the 
game solution. For p~re strategies, it is the worst 
outcome for a given variety. For the Savage re-
gret criterion, it is the lowest weighted outcome of 
the given strategy in any year. The maximum 
column, (Max.)js derived in the same manner, ex-
cept':that the best outcomes are considered. 
The'column labeled average (Av.) is simply the 
average.outcome for each of the four strategies. 
If each state of,nature is equally likely to occur, 
then over,~.long period of years the farmer could 
expect to recei1re!,tlJ.at average xield. If less favor-
able years are :lllQre' likely than the better years, 
then the "long-run expectations would be lower. 
Assuming complete uncertainty, neither of these 
possibilities, can : really, be ,verified or rejected. 
Some farmers; however , may want to consider this 
long-run . average when making a decision. 
The, regret. column is included primarily to aid 
in ,demollstrating the characteristics of various 
solutions. ' ,Nevertheless, 'a farmer who really 
wants,t~ minimize regret, would be interested in 
TABLE 3. STRATEGIES AND POSSIBLE OUTCOMES'SUGGESTED BY FOUR DECISION MOD,ELS APPLIED TO THE HOWARD COUNTY (NORTHEAST IOWA) OAT-VARIETY·PROBLEM; , 
Decision model Strategy 
Type of Percent 
Criterion" strategyb Variety" of Inndd 
Wald .............. , .. _ .•.........•.. Mixed Clintland 56 
Sauk 44 
100 
Laplace .............................. Pure Clarion 100 




Hurwicz l ............................ Pure 
0:::; 0: :::; 0.5 Clarion 100 
0.5 :::; 0: :::; 0.66 Bonham 100 
0.66:::; 0: :::; 1 Clintland 100 
• This column gives the decision models used to solve the farmer decision )IrObleli' -. 
b This column indicates whether the farmer is to use one single course of action ';1' .everal. 
"Variety choices resulting from application of alternative decision models. ' , 
Possible outcome 
Min.~ .. Av.' Ma.x.· Ma.x. rell'ret-
bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
54.3 70.5 103.2 56.68 
450 79.4 111.0 16.0 
48 . .0:-" 75.0 97.5 13.44 
45.0-' ,'- 79.4 111.0 16.0 
4.6 • .0 
" 
75.6 110.0 27.0 
49.0 7.3.8 . 104.0 30.0 
4 The percentage of land to be used for each alternative comprising the farmer's strategy. 
• The worst outcome which can result from following a given strategy. ! The long-':lln average outcome expected, assuming that the states of nature considered Include all possible, states of nature and that each "state" 
I~ equally hkely. -
• The blghest outcome possible from following the given strategy. ..' ': .. , 
h The maximum outcome roreg!l~e as a result of chOOBing a less profitable alternative, viewed ex .post. .. __ -
I The 0: value re!lec:tl! the declslon-maker's degree of belief that the worst posllible· outCOMe will OcCUr for· any act (e.g., oat variety) he selects. The 
stra~ for t!te indiVidual who expects the worst to happen (0: = 1) Is the act containing the highest minimum gain and may be found by the Wald 
solution ~es.crlbed In .the text. The strategy for" the individual who expects the highest possible income (0: = 0) for any act he selects i8 simply the 
act containing the highest outcome of all acts. Other strategies are specified .. for individuals' _with- degrees of pessimism between these extremes 
(I.e.. 0 < 0: < 1). These strategies al'e found by weighting the lowest and highest outcomes in each act by the 0: value as described in the text. 
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that column. A farmer who does. not .wish to fore-
go an opportunity for very high. yields would. at 
least take note of that column. : . . .. 
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE CRITERIA 
One problem setting, which discuf5sion in a pre-
vious section indicated should be considered, was 
a situation in which a farmer wishes to maximize 
long-run profit. It should be recalled that he must 
be able and willing to accept short-run unfavor-
able outcomes. The strategy suggested by the La-
place criterion has the highest average of any al-
ternative.16 The strategy is to use Clarion oats on 
all acres. Although yields in some years may be 
45 bushels per acre, yields may be 111 bushels per 
acre in other years. The farmer using thestiategy 
must be confident that the distribution of years 
which he faces will not result in some other strat-
eg-y having a higher Rverage over the long run. 
Clarion oats averag-e about 4 bushels per acre 
above other varieties; thus, each.sear does not 
have to occur exactly the same number of times. 
The second problem setting is one in which a 
farmer must consider short-run outcomes. The 
setting essentially implies that, for some reason, 
the farmer must have an outcome above a given 
level or must have the maximum certain outcome 
possible. It would only apply to the variety prob-
lem if the consequences of yields falling below a 
minimum income level are very severe. This 
might be the case where a crop provides the major 
source of income or where the grain is needed for 
an inflexible livestock system. 
The Wald solution suggests planting 56 percent 
of oat land to Clintland and 44 percent to SaukY 
Using this strategy, a yield of 54.3 bushels per 
acre would be assured every year.18 That is the 
best strateg-y against the worst that nature can 
do. Nature's best strategy (worst for the farmer) 
is to use its 1953 strategy 89 percent of the time 
and its 1956 strateg-y 11 percent of. the time. The 
security level of 54.3 bushels is 5 bushels higher 
than that of the next best strateg-y. A farmer fol-
lowing this plan would sacrifice in terms of aver-
age and maximum possibilities. His regret in some 
years would be 56.7 bushels. That is. he would find 
that in some years another plan would have given 
him an additional 56.7 bushels per acre. 
Farmers with problem settings between the two just specified might find another plan more de-
sirable. One farmer might be willing to accept a 
lower security level to get a hi.g-her possible aver-
age. The Hurwicz criterion with 0.66 < ex: < 1 
provides such a plan. As ex: becomes smaller, the 
security level decreases. and averages increase. 
Other farmers might follow a plan suggested by 
18 It is the same as the strategy for the Hurwicz criterion. 0 :$ a: :$ 0.5. 
"All problems considered in this diSJ!ertation have alternative cou,.".". 
of action which are not mutually exclusive. Thus. a mixed strategy will 
always call for using .several courses of action simultaneously. For ex-
ample, several oat varieties may be used in one year by planting x per 
cent of the land to one variety and perhaps (100 - x) percent of the 
land to another variety. The strategy-possible outcome table for each 
problem gives the precentage of the relevant resource (i.e .• land. T.n.N .• 
pasture. etc.) to be used for each course of action comprising a strategy. 
,. It is. assumed that all possible years are included in the states of 
nature considered. 
the Hurwicz criterion with a smaller ex:. A farmer 
who wishes to' minimize regret would use Clint-
land on 25 percent of his oat land, Clarion on 66 
percent and Sauk on 9 percent. 
Farmers and researchers will be interested in 
the solutions with regard to the maturity time of 
the varieties they sug-gest. The Wald mixed strat-
egy calls for using Clintland, a midseason variety, 
and Sauk, a late season variety. Thus, a conserva-
tive farmer apparently would plant varieties with 
these two maturity times. A farmer who wants a 
higher average would plant Clarion, a midseason 
variety. The Savage regret criterion says to use 
two midseason varieties and one late variety. The 
gambling strategy, the Hurwicz criterion with 
o < ex: <: 0.5, calls for using Clarion, also. Only 
the Hurwicz solution with 0.5 < ex: < 0.66 says 
to use the early variety, Bonham. Thus, most of 
the criteria agree that late or midseason varieties 
are preferable. 
METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS 
The farmer problem represented by table 1 has 
a characteristic which is quite common to agricul-
tural data. It was pointed out previously that, ac-
cording to the assumptions of game theory, na-
ture would never use its 1954. 1955 and 1957 strat-
egies. That is, it is assumed that nature is trying 
to do its worst to the farmer. Thus, it would not 
use strategies which have a higher pavoff for 
each farmer alternative than another strategy. 
When the Wald solution is obtained. these vears 
must be excluded from the pavoff mat,rix. Thns. 
the Wald solution is extremelv pessimistic. Na-
ture. however. is not necessarilv tryinp,' to do its 
worst to the farmer. Nevertheless. snch pessim-
ism may. be necessary under certain problem 
settings. 
The reg-,ret matrix does not shnw the t'!hsmv~­
teristic iust pointed onto H is un1il<elv that tl,e 
reg-rets for one year will all be le~s thsm thoC!e for 
another, so that nature has an inferior straterrv. 
One alternative often yields hig-hest for one ~tRte 
of nature, and another yields highest for a differ-
ent state of nature. Therefore, a mixed strateg-y 
is obtained more often from the Savage regret cri-
terion than from the Wald criterion. 
The Savage regret solution for the Howard 
County oat variety problem has a relatively hiP..'h 
security level and average return, but it has the 
lowest maximum. It actually gives a ulan with 
less yield variation than other plans. Few farm-
ers are likely to select a plan because it has the 
least variation. They may prefer a plan with great 
variation. providing- the variation arises from ex-
tremely hig-h yields rather than extremely low 
ones. The Savage regret solution for this problem 
resulted from the nature of the data and the ob-jective implied by the Savag-e regret criterion. 
The criterion seeks to minimize regret, thus the 
solution is 'affected by the fact that Sauk oats out-
yield other varieties in all but 2 years. In one of 
.. those years. Sauk had the lowest yield, zero bush-
els. Thus, Sauk is brought into the plan, but at a 
low level. Clintland and Clarion are in the plan 
1)8~ 
because they each had highest yields in one year 
and relatively low regrets in other years. 
CHOICE OF OAT VARIETIES IN SOUTHERN IOWA 
AND WESTERN IOWA 
Applications of game criteria to oat yield data 
are presented in this section for the Seymour-
Shelby soil association area (southern Iowa) and 
for western Iowa. Data were obtained from prog-
ress reports from the Seymour~Shelby Experi-
mental Farm and the Western Iowa Experimental 
Farm. 
Tables A-I and A-2 of the appendix contain the 
farmer-nature payoff matrices for these ·two 
areas. These tables correspond to table 1. Six oat 
varieties are included in table A-I to demonstrate 
how inferior farmer alternatives may be elimi-
nated. A comparison of yields in table A-I shows 
that Clintland out yielded Bonham in each of the 4 
years covered by the data. Thus, Bonham is an 
inferior strategy. ClintIand oats also dominate 
Clinton in each year. Therefore, Clinton is elimi-
nated as a farmer alternative. 
Tables A-3 and A-4 in the appendix show the 
regret matrices for these problems. Those tables 
correspond to table 2. Bonham and Clinton are 
again inferior varieties. The regret for Clintland 
in each year is less than the regret for either of 
those two varieties. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the strategies and possible 
outcomes suggested by the game theoretic criteria 
for southern and western Iowa. Appropriate plans 
for different problem settings can be obtained 
from tables 4 and 5. The same criteria discussed 
in the Howard County section are appropriate for 
these areas. Plans suited to different problem set-
tings are summarized in table 6. 
TABLE 4. STRATEGIES AND POSSIBLE OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY FOUR DECISION MODELS APPLIED TO THE SEYMOUR-SHELBY 





Wald .................................. Pure 
Laplace· .............................. Pure 
Savage ................... , ••.....•.. Mi'!'ed 















































W .. ld .................................. Pure 
Laplace ........ : ..................... Pure 
"av.age .............................. Mixed. 
Hurwicz ............................. Pure 





















































TABLE 6. ALTERNATIVE RESEARCH OR EXTENSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OAT VARIETIES IN THREE AREAS OF IOWA. 
Northern towa Southern Iowa Western Iowa 
Problem setting Variety Pereent Variety Percent Variety Percent 
choice of land 
1. Th .. farmer can follow a plan which 
may lead to highest long-run profits. Clarion 100 
1a. The farmer wanta to gamble for thc 
highest yield possible. He is in a \>0-
sition to accept the consequences of 
unfavorable outcomes. Clarion 100 
2. The farmer must consider short-run Clintland 56 
outcomes. He must have assurance 
of a maximum minimum Income or Sauk 44 
more each year. 100 
ClintIand 25 
2a. The farmer must consider short-rlln Clarion 66 
Sauk 9 outcomes. bu't can give Borne weight 
to long.run profit adVantages of a or 100' 
plan. Cllntland 
ALTERNATIVE RESEARCH AND EXTENSION 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
100 
Four problem settings are visualized in table 6; 
1a and 2a are actually less strict statements of 
settings 1 and 2, respectively. The Laplace cri-
terion solution is used as the recommendation for 
problem setting 1. The Hurwicz solution with the 
smallest range of 0: gives the plan for setting 1a. 
The Wald criterion yields the plan for setting 2. 
The Savage regret mixed strategy is the plan sug-
gested for setting 2a. In two areas, the Hurwicz 
criterion with a large 0: is also deemed applicable 
for problem setting 2a. It gives a higher security 
level, but a lower average, than the Savage regret 
criterion. It is clear that all farmers would, not 
wish to follow the Laplace-type recommendation 
usually made. 
The maturity times of the recommended varie-
ties differ between areas. For problem setting 1, 
midseason varieties are recommended in northern 
and southern Iowa, and a late variety is suggested 
for western Iowa. Setting la, the gambling set-
ting, calls for a midseason variety in northern 
Iowa and a late variety in the west and south. 
The conservative farmer, characterized by prob-
lem setting 2, would use a mixture of midseason 
and late varieties in the north, late in the south 
and early in western Iowa. For setting2a, only 
farmers in western Iowa would include an early 
variety in their plans. 
CHOICE OF BARLEY VARIETIES IN WESTERN IOWA 
Farmers with opposite kinds of problem set-
tings need not always have completely different 
plans. To demonstrate this, barley yields from 
western Iowa are considered. Two barley varie-
ties, Plains and Mars, out yielded other varieties 
each year during the period 1953 through 1957. 
choice of land choice of land 
Clintland 100 Sauk 100 
Sauk 100 Cllntland 100 
Sauk 100 Cherokee 100 
Clintland 69 Cherokee 28 
Sauk 31 Clinth,nd 20 
or 100 Clarion 1 
Sauk 100 SlIuk 51 
100 
Thus, it is assumed that these two varieties are 
the farmer's only relevant alternatives. Tables A-5 
and A-6 contain the payoff and regret matrices 
for this problem. The farmer has two alternatives, 
and nature has five. 
Table 7 shows the strategies and outcomes for 
the game theoretic decision criteria. A farmer can 
obtain the highest long-run average by planting 
Plains barley. The farmer wishing the highest 
possible security level would also plant Plains. 
Even if a farmer wants to minimize regret, he 
would plant mostly Plains. The addition of the 
Mars variety to his plan reduces his security level 
only slightly. The only farmer who would plant 
Mars exclusively is one who wants to gamble on 
the highest yield possible. 
The situation just described is significant be-
cause it allows a research or extension worker to 
make simple recommendations with confidence. 
Assuming that the varieties are equal in other 
respects, Plains barley could be generally recom-
mended for western Iowa. The researcher might 
also mention that Mars may out yield Plains in 
a few years so that the individual operator can 
consider the alternative of gambling on a maxi-
mum yield. 
CHOICE OF CORN VARIETIES 
Data for this section were obtained from annual 
Iowa corn yield tests. IS One set of yields comes 
from northeast Iowa, Iowa Corn Test Area 3. The 
other comes from southern Iowa, Iowa Corn Test 
Area 11. Varieties adapted to the two areas are 
different because of difference in growing seasons. 
Varieties were sele~ted which had relatively high 
yields, in comparison with other varieties tested, 
to Iowa com yield test. 1951 through 1957. Iowa Agr. and Home Econ. 
Exp. Stll. and Cool'. Ext. Serv. Bulletins P·1U, 115, 116. 118. 120. 
123 and 124. 1952 throuch 1958. 
'rABLE 7. STRATl!lGIES AND POSSIBLE OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY DECISION 'ORITERIA APPLIED TO WESTERN IOWA BARLEY· 
VARIETY PROBLEM.-














Wald ..........•.......•............... Pure Plains 100 
J.aplace .............................. Pure Plains 100 





Hurwicz .............................. Pure 
o ~ a: ~ 0.1i4 Mars 1,00 
0.54 ~ a: ~ 1 Plains 100 
• See the footnotes of table 3 for an explanation of this table. 
over several years of testing. Differences in per-
formances of the varieties considered are rather 
small and perhaps not significant. Even small 
differences may be important to some farmers, 
however. 
Northeast Iowa. Table A-7 in the appendix con-
tains the farmer-nature payoff matrix for north-
east Iowa corn-variety yields. Every variety had 
a lower yield in 1955 than for any other year. It 
must be assumed that nature would always use its 
1955 strategy, thus no Wald mixed strategy can 
be obtained. Table A-8 shows the regret matrix 
for this problem. A Savage mixed strategy can 
be obtained. 
Table 8 shows strategies and outcomes suggest-
ed by four decision criteria. A farmer wanting a 
maximum long-run average yield should use 
P.A.G.277. His yields may be 86 bushels per acre 
in some years and 129 bushels per acre in other 
years. Over the long run, his average yields should 
be almost 1 bushel per acre higher than from any 
21 48 62 6 
21 48 62 6 
'20 47 64 4.2 
16 43 68 
21 48 62 6 
other single variety. The most this plan can cost 
him in terms of opportunity missed (regret) is 8 
bushels per acre. 
On the basis of the data, a farmer who wants to 
be sure of the highest possible yield every year 
should plant Pioneer 371. His security level with 
that variety is 93 bushels per acre. He must, how-
ever, accept a lower long-run expectation. In some 
years, his regret may be 12 bushels per acre. 
From a practical point of view, the Savage re-
gret criterion suggests a desirable plan. It pro-
vides a higher security level than the Laplace 
plan; however, the average is only slightly lower. 
A farmer following this plan would, of course, be 
certain that he would never sacrifice more than 
4.8 bushels because of choosing the wrong plan. 
Southern Iowa. Table A-9 in the appendix 
shows the farmer-nature payoff matrix for south-
ern Iowa variety yields. In this case, only 1952, 
1953, 1956 and 1957 are inferior strategies for na-
ture. However, the Wald solution calls for a pure 






Wald .................................. Pure 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
Savage regret. ..............•...• Mixed 
H'urwicz .............................. Pure 
o ~ a: ~ 0.5 
























Min. Av. Max. Max. regret 
bu.!a. bu.!a. bu./a. bu.!a. 
93 111.4 122 12 
86 112.2 129 8 
88 111.7 124.1 4.8 
86 112.2 129 8 
93 111.4 122 12 
strategy because Pioneer 301b has its minimum 
yield in 1955, and that yield is also the maximum 
yield of any variety for that year. That is, the 
minimum in a row is also the maximum in a" co-
lumn. Table A-10 in the appendix contains the 
regret matrix for this problem. A mixed strategy 
can be obtained from this matrix. 
Table 9 shows that Pioneer 301b will fulfill 
farmer requirements in both of the problem set-
tings considered in this section. It not only has 
the highest security level but also has the highest 
average. The farmer who wants to gamble on the 
highest possible yield would use P.A.G. 170. The 
Savage solution requires only a small sacrifice in 
security level and average to follow a plan which 
provides the least possible regret. 
CHOICE OF FERTILIZER COMBINATIONS AND 
AMOUNTS 
"" Two fertilizer problems are considered in this 
section. The first requires choice of nutrient com-
binations and levels of fertilizer for producing 
corn. The second is a composite problem requiring 
choice of varieties, stand level and amount of ni-
trogen fertilizer for producing corn. The analysis 
for both of these problems demonstrates that data 
available from present experiments may be adapt-
ed for use with various decision models. 
CHOICE OF MANURE, PHOSPHORUS AND 
POTASSIUM LEVELS 
Nm·theast Iowa. Data for solving this problem 
were obtained from experimental results at the 
Howard County Experimental Farm and the Car-
rington-Clyde Experimental Farm. The Howard 
County data are considered first. The data are 
from manure-phosphorus-potassium experiments 
conducted from 1952 through 1957. The experi-
ment actually included a 3-year corn-oats-meadow 
rotation; but only the corn data are considered in 
:"th~s l)r~blem. 7'he aggregate yields of all crops in 
the rotation could have been considered. Because 
only corn 1s studied, the carryover effects of fer-
tilizer on other crops are not credited to returns 
from fertilizer. 
The experiment provides data which might be 
considered as eight farmer alternatives. These in-
clude no fertilizer (Ck.), manure only (M), phos-
phorus only (P), potassium only (K), phosphorus 
and potassium (PK) , manure and phosphorus 
(MP), manure and potassium (MK), and manure, 
phosphorus and potassium (MPK). Manure was 
applied at the rate of 6 tons per acre, ahead of 
corn in the rotation. Phosphorus and potassium 
were both applied at the rate of 30 lbs. per acre. 
It is assumed that these are all the alternatives 
about which the farmer has knowledge. Actually, 
he might include other levels or combinations of 
fertilizer as alternatives. Table A-ll in the appen-
dix shows the farmer-nature fertilizer game when 
manure is free. The farmer has eight alternative 
strategies, and nature has six strategies. Each 
year is regarded as a state of nature. Table A-12 
in the appendix shows the regret matrix for this 
problem. 
Payoffs are returns above fertilizer costs and 
cost of application!O A constant, equal to the 
value of production in the lowest year for corn not 
fertilized, is subtracted from each payoff to re-
duce the size of the payoffs. Table A-ll is the 
payoff matrix for a situation in which a farmer 
has manure available and need only charge for 
applying it. It is assumed that he has no alterna-
tive use for the manure or that it is most profit-
ably used on corn. Table A-13 shows the payoff 
.. A detailed dl!5Cription of the manner in which payoffs were compUted 
is contained in a footnote of table A-11. 






Wald .................................. Pure 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
Savage regret .................... Mixed 
Hurwicz .............................. Pure 
o ::;; 0: ::;; 0.5 





















































matrix for this fertilizer problem when manure is 
not free. A ton of manure is roughly equivalent to 
100 pounds of 10-5-10 fertilizer. Thus, rather than 
apply manure, the farmer can use 600 pounds 'of 
10-5-10. The cost of fertilizer to replace manure is 
subtracted from payoffs in table A-13. The Sav-
age regret matrix for this problem is contained in 
table A-14 of the appendix. 
The strategies and outcomes suggested by the 
four-game theoretic decision criteria are shown in 
tables 10 and 11. A farmer whose planning hori-
zon and resource situation allow him to plan over 
the long run would use manure and phosphorus on 
corn. This is the plan given by the Laplace solu-
tion. Even though he must buy fertilizer to sub-
stitute for manure, he should follow the same plan. 
This plan also indicates the amount of fertilizer 
which apparently is most profitable over the long 
run. The level is roughly 60 pounds of nitrogen, 
60 pounds of phosphorus and 60 pounds of potas-
sium. It is assumed that all possible kinds of 
weather years, with prices constant, are rep-
resented in the data, available. Thus, caution 
should be taken in making such a recommenda-
tion. The need for data from longer term experi-
ments is made clear in this example. 
The farmer who must be sure of the highest 
possible level of returns each year will use only 
manure, providing it is free. If he must buy sub-
stitutes for manure, he will use phosphorus and 
TABLE 10. STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY FOUR DECISION CRITERIA APPLIED TO HOWARD COUNTY FERTILIZER 





Wald .................................. Pure 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
SRVage regret .................... Mixed 
Hurwicz .............................. Pure 
0:0:;; ex: ~ 0.74 
















































TABLE 11. STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY Jo'OUR DECISION CRITERIA APPLIED TO HOWARD COUNTY FERTILIZER 





Wald ................................ Mixed 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
S"vage regret.. .................. Mixed 
Hurwicz .............................. Pure 
o ~ ex: "S 0.68 




















































potassium on 77 percent of his land and manure 
and phosphorus on 23 percent. These plans differ 
from the long-run profit-maximizing plan in both 
the level and the kind of fertilizer used. The ma-
nure plan includes only 60-30-60, and the PK plan 
only 0-30-30, as compared with the 60-60-60 plan 
for the other problem setting. The reason for the 
plan differences may be seen by reference to table 
A-13. Additional nitrogen and phosphorus do not 
result in higher profit in some years. Where ma-
nure is not free, the farmer may raise his security 
level $9 by using less fertilizer. He sacrifices very 
little in possible long-run average. Thus, even a 
farmer who can plan to maximize long-run profits 
might prefer the Wald mixed strategy. 
The Savage regret strategy provides a plan 
which combines characteristics of both the Wald 
and Laplace plans. Its security level, particularly 
when manure is free, is not much less than that of 
the Wald solution. The average for the Savage 
regret plan is within a few cents of that of the 
Laplace. In addition, the Savage plan will more 
nearly be the most profitable one in many years 
because the maximum regret is considerably lower 
than the possible regr.et for other plans. The 
Hurwicz solution for this problem is very similar 
or identical to those of other criteria. 
Northeast Central Iowa. Tables A-15 and A-17 
in the appendix contain the farmer-nature payoff 
TABLE 12. STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY FOUR DECISION CRITERIA APPLIED TO CARRINGTON.CLYDE FERTILIZER 





Wold .................................. Pure 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
~avoge regreL .................. Mixed 


















Min. Av. Max. Max. regret 
$/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
23.80 49.24 72.44 4.58 
23.80 49.24 72.44 4.58 
21.80 48.84 69.63 3.10 
23.80 49.24 72.44 4.58 
TABLE 13. STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY FOUR DECISION CRITERIA APPLIED TO CARRINGTON.CLYDE FERTILIZER 





Wald .................................. Pure 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
Savage regret .................... Mixeci 


























Av. Max. Max. regret 
$/ ... $/a. $/a. 
33.62 61.28 16.60 
36.05 59.24 5.46 
35.21 57.42 3.86 
33.62 61.28 16.60 
995 
matrices for corn production in the Carrington-
Clyde soil area. Tables A-16 and A-18 in the ap-
pendix contain the regret matrices for this -prob-
lem. Tables 12 and 13 show strategies andp()ssi-
ble outcomes for farmers who have manure and 
for those who must buy a manure substitute. 
If a farmer wants to maximize long-run profit, 
he might always apply MP. When manure is free, 
MP also provides the highest security level. If 
the farmer must buy a manure substitute, how-
ever, PK provides the highest security level. In 
that case, a farmer would use no nitrogen, and 
P 205 and K20 applications would be cut in half. 
He can raise his security level $2.24 by using a 
lower level of fertilizer. Evidently, very little ad-
ditional returns are obtained from nitrogen and 
heavy amounts of P 20 5 and K 20 in some years. 
This may be verified by reference to table A-17. 
To minimize regret when manure is free, a 
farmer must accept a lower security level and 
average return. If manure substitutes must be 
purchased, the Savage regret solution results in a 
lower security level than all other plans. It has a 
higher average than the Wald plan, however. It 
seems unlikely that a farmer would follow such a 
plan unless he does wish to minimize regret. 
CHOICE OF VARIETY, FERTILIZER LEVEL AND 
STAND LEVEL 
Each crop enterprise requires a number of in-
dividual decisions. A farmer must choose varie-
ties, fertilizers and cultural practices. There are 
a number of possible choices within each decision 
category. The outcome of each often is affected 
by the same states of nature. The outcome of 
each possible choice also is affected by decisions 
on other aspects of the crop enterprise. All com-
binations of one variety alternative, one fertilizer 
alternative and one cultural practice alternative 
form a set of farmer courses of action. The pos-
sible states of nature form nature's strategies. 
Thus, a problem is formed which is appropriate. 
for game theoretic analysis. A farmer problem of 
this type is considered in this section. 
Data for this problem were obtained from a 
planting rate and nitrogen experiment conducted 
d the Seymour-Shelby Experimental Farm in 
:-,outhern Iowa. Two varieties, four stand levels 
and three nitrogen levels were included in the ex-
periment. Only replication averages are used in 
the analysis. The following regression equation 
was fitted to the data for each variety: 
2 2 
Y = a + b1x1 + b2x1 + b3xa + b4xa + b::;x1x2 
+ b6x1x 2xa (1) 
where Y = predicted yield; 
Xl = nitrogen level; 
X 2 = stand level; and 
X3 = a rainfall variable. 
Table A-19 of the appendix contains the experi-
mental data and the regression equation fitted. 
Also, each of the variables included in equation 1 
is explained in table A-19. The equation was fit-
ted so that levels of the variables could be select-
996 
ed, rather than being limited to the levels involved 
·in the-experiment. 
... "Table A-20 of the appendix shows a payoff ma-
trix constructed by use of equation 1. Nitrogen 
levels of 0, 10, 20, 40 and 60 pounds per acre were 
used. Stand levels of 12,000, 16,000 and 20,000 
were included. Rainfall amounts used were 6, 8, 
10 and 12 inches. The two alternative varieties-
an early one and an adapted one-also are includ-
ed. Only farmer alternatives which are not infe-
rior to another alternative at all rainfall levels are 
included in table A-20. It will be noted that na-
ture has only one noninferior strategy. Thus, the 
Wald solution must be a pure strategy. Table A-21 
of the appendix shows the Savage regret matrix 
for this problem. Only noninferior nature strat-
egies are included. The 5 years during which the 
experiment was conducted were not favorable for 
using high nitrogen and stand levels. Thus, the 
results shown discourage use of high levels of fer-
tilizer and stand. The rainfall variable used only 
partially relates yields to weather conditions. 
Rainfall timeliness, temperatures and maturing 
conditions are also important. These were gener-
ally unfavorable during the period 1953 through 
1957. Results for the experiment in 1958 show a 
much higher yield increase from nitrogen and 
stand. 
The regression equation allows use of two oth-
er decision models discussed earlier. These are the 
average and the probability (risk) approaches. An 
average weather condition can be estimated and 
substituted in equation 1. Then, marginal analy-
sis may be used to determine the most profitable 
long-run alternatives. Probabilities of various 
levels of rainfall for use in the probability (risk) 
model may be estimated by use of past weather 
records. These probabilities may then be used to 
estimate the long-run average outcome for each 
alternative. The one with the highest average is 
the alternative selected. 
Only the probability approach is used here. Use 
of an average would give similar results to that of 
the Laplace criterion. The problem of selecting 
discrete levels is similar to the one of specifying 
activities for linear programming analysis.21 
Weather records for the period 1925 through 
1957 were examined to determine the frequency 
with which various rainfall levels occurred. The 
following frequencies for the rainfall variable used 
in this analysis were found: rainfall < 7 inches, 
0.06; 7 inches < rainfall < 9 inches, 0.1; 9 inches 
< rainfall < 11 inches, 0.13; and rainfall > 11 
inches, 0.71. These frequencies were applied to 
the data in table A-20 to determine the plan with 
the highest long-run expectation. Table 14 shows 
the plan suggested by the probability model, as 
well as those suggested by other decision criteria. 
It also shows possible results of using the alter-
native plans. 
The first problem setting considered is again 
that in which a farmer can plan to obtain highest 
. . Teturns over a long period of time. Two plans in 
" Heady and Candler. op. cit .• Chs. 3 and 6. 
TABLE 14. STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY FIVE DECISION MODlilLS APPIJ:EO 
STAND·VARIETY ,PROBLEM.· 
TO SEYMOUR-SliELBY NITROGEN. 
Decision model Strategy P~"ihle o\lt~ome 
Type of 
strategy 
Percent Min. Av. Max. Max. regret 
Criterion Alternative of land 
Probability .................... __ .... Pure Adapted variety; 
S=12,OOO; N=20 100 
"'aid .................................. Pure Early variety; 
S:=12.000; N:=O 100 . 
Laplace ............... __ ............. Pure Early variety; 
S:=12,OOO; N=O 100 
Savage ..... __ ....................... Mixed E"rly variety; 
S:= 12.000; N= 0 53 
Adapted variety; 
S:= 12.000; N=O 47 
100 
Hurwicz ....................... : ...... Pure 
o -:s; ex -:s; 0.09 
0.09 -:s; ex -:s; 0.11 
0.11 -:s; ex -:s; 0.2 
0.2 -:s; ex: -:s; 0.38 






S:= 12.000; N=20 
Adapted variety; 
S:= 12.000; N=O 
Adapted variety: 
S=12.000; N=O 
• ::;ee the fODtnot"" of table 3 for an explanation of this table. 
table 14 are suited to this setting. If the fariner 
is willing to assume that past rainfall records pro-
vide a good estimate of the probability that vari-
ous amounts of rainfall will occur, he may use a 
probability model. His average expectations over 
a period of years would be $49.63. In some years, 
he can get only $1.67, while in other years he can 
get $56.34 above the cost of fertilizer, seed, trans-
portation and storage. His plan would be to use 
the adapted variety, 20 pounds of fertilizer and a 






The Laplace plan given in table 14 is also ap-
propriate for this problem setting. The plan giv-
en by the Laplace criterion is the early variety 
with no fertilizer and a 12,000-plant-per-acre 
stand level. A farmer using this plan would not 
feel he knows enough about the distribution of 
weather to use the probability approach. The aver-
age of the Laplace plan thus is not strictly com-
parable to that of the probability plan. ' 
The farmer who must insure himself the high-
est possible level of income each year would fol-
low a plan identical to that of the Laplace. A 
farmer with an optimism-pessimism index greater 
than 0.38 would also follow this plan. Only a farm-
er willing to gamble or wishing to minimize regret 
would use another plan. These plans are the 
Hurwicz solutions with 0 < 0:: < 0.38 and the 
Savage regret solution. 
The preceding analysis indicates many possi-
bilities for using experimental data for decision-
making under uncertainty. Because of the low 
rainfalls experienced during the years this experi-
ment was run, the use of fertilizer does not ap-
pear to be very profitable. The rainfall amounts 
included in the rainfall variable used average more 
than 12 inches in this section of Iowa. The limits 
of 6 inches and 12 inches had to be placed on this 
problem to avoid extrapolating outside the range 
of the data available. Therefore, it seems advisa-
$/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
1.67 49.63 56.54 7.58 
9.26 37.05 52.28 4.71 
9.25 37.05 52.28 4.71 
6.34 36.15 54.03 2.94 
-4.24 32.13 56.99 13.49 
0.31 :13.90 56.58 8.U 
1.67 34.63 56.34 7.58 
3.05 35.14 56.00 6.20 
9.25 27.05 52.28 4.71 
ble to regard this analysis primarily as an exam-
ple. Real decision-making guides may be derived 
from this experiment after it has run. long enough 
to include a wider range of weather conditions. At 
that time, the rainfall variable might be refined 
to reflect other important weather characteristics. 
CHOICE OF CROP ENTERPRISES 
'The sample problem used is a choice between 
oat and barley enterprises in western Iowa. The 
problem matrices for this example are contained 
in tables A-22 and A-23 of the appendix. Only i) 
years of data are considered so that currently rec-
ommended varieties can be used in the example. 
An alternative is to use a long series of oat and 
barley yields without regard to variety to insure 
the inclusion of more possible outcomes than arp. 
shown in 5 years of data. 
Table 15 shows the strategies and outcomes 
suggested by various decision criteria. Barley was 
selected by both the Wald and Laplace criteria. 
Thus, barley is apparently the "safest" crop and 
the most profitable over the long run. If a farmer 
wants to gamble on higher returns, he may grow 
Sauk oats or a combination of Sauk oats and 
Plains barley. Choice on the basis of profitability 
assumes that the crops cost the same to produce 
and offer no partiCUlar advantage in other ways, 
such as use for a nurse crop for legumes. 
The prices used for a problem such as this af-
fect the outcome of the analysis. Prices could be 
included in the problem. Possible oat-barley price 
situations could be obtained by examining series 
of past prices. Then all combinations of possible 
price and yield situations could be regarded as 
states of nature. 
CHOICE OF PASTURE MIXTURES 
Considerable research has been conducted on 
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tABLE 16. sTRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY bliXlISION ORITll:iUA APl'LIEb '1'0 A CROP EN'i'ERPRISl!l SKLECTION 
PROBLEM." 
Decision mod.l Strategy Possible outcome 
Type of 
strategy 
Percent Min. Av. Max. Max. regret 
edterion Crop of land $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
Wald .................................. Pure Plains barley 
Laplace .................•..........•. Pure Plains barley 
S"vage regret .................... Mlxed Sauk oats 
Plain. barley 
Hurwicz __ ............. u •••••••• ___ •• Pure 
o :::; cr :::;: 0.68 Sauk oats 
0.68 :::;: cr :::; 1 Plains barley 
• See the footnotes of table 3 for an explanation of thill table. 
pasture mixtures for Iowa. Many of the new 
grasses and legumes out yield older ones. Research 
and extension educational efforts have interested 
many farmers in seeding the new mixtures. An 
analysis of data available on the newer mixtures, 
however, indicates that one mixture is not clearly 
superior to another in every year. Assuming that 
the mixtures cost about the same and are equal in 
other respects, which mixture should farmers 
plant, given variations in their problem setting? 
CHOICE OF PASTURE MIXTURES IN NORTHEAST IOWA 
The pasture mixtures considered for Howard 








17 38.4 50 14 
17 38.4 50 14 
13 36.8 8.5 
8 35 64 16 
17 38.4 50 14 
bluegrass, Ladino-orchardgrass and alfalfa-timo-
thy. It is assumed that the mixture of grass and 
legume will remain in such a proportion over the 
years that the proper balance is maintained to 
avoid bloat. Data for these mixtures over the 
years 1954-57 are presented in a payoff matrix in 
table A-24 of the appendix. Entries are in tons of 
dry matter per acre. Table A-25 of the appendix 
contains the regret matrix for the same data. 
The plans and possible outcomes suggested by 
alternative decision criteria are presented in table 
16. A farmer with a flexible livestock system may 
want to follow the Laplace solution given in table 
16. It calls for using an alfalfa-bromegrass mix-
ture. Over a period of years, this plan may result 






Wald .................................. Pure 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
Savage .............................. Mixed 
Hurwicz .............................. Pure 
o :::;: cr :::; 0.71 



























Min. Av. Max. Max. regret 
tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. 
1.9 2.4 3.1 1.5 
1.7 2.5 3.6 1.4 
1.6 2.3 3.0 0.75 
1.7 2.5 3.6 1.4 
1.9 2 •• 3.1 1.5 
in an average production of 2.5 tons of dry mat-
ter per acre. In some years the production may 
be only 1.7 tons per acre, but livestock numbers 
can be adjusted to fit the production in this prob-
lem setting. The Hurwicz solution for 0 :( 0:: :( 
0.71 also calls for using alfalfa-bromegrass. The 
size of the 0:: indicates that this plan is not really 
a "risky" one. Nevertheless, some farmers may 
not be able. or willing to take the small gamble 
required. 
A farmer with an inflexible livestock system 
may wish to follow the Wald plan given in table 16. 
Assume that the profitability of his livestock sys-
tem depends on the size of the enterprise and that 
this size is limited by the amount of pasture he 
can depend on each summer. He wants a pasture 
mixture that will give him the highest possible as-
sured level of pasture every year. By following 
the Wald criterion, he can be sure of 1.9 tons of 
dry pasture matter per year. This would allow 
him to expand his livestock program to a higher 
level than is possible with another pasture mix-
ture. Alfalfa-timothy is the pasture mixture sug-
gested. The Hurwicz criterion with 0.71 :( 0:: < 1 
gives the same plan as the Wald criterion. The 
Savage plan is particularly inappropriate for this 
problem setting. An examination of table A-25 of 
the appendix shows that the year when regret is a 
maximum for this plan is a year of low yields. 
This may very well be a year in which the cost of 
having a nonoritimum plan is highest. Feed costs 
might be particularly high that year. If a farmer 
wishes to minimize regret, however, he may plant 
53 percent of his land to alfalfa-bromegrass and 
47 percent to Ladino-Kentucky bluegrass. 
CHOICE OF PASTURE MIXTURES IN SOUTHWEST IOWA 
Data from the Soil Conservation Farm in Page 
County, southwest Iowa, are used for this prob-
lem. 'rwo sets of pasture data are used. One in-
cludes alfalfa and grass mixtures; the other in-
cludes legume-grass mixtures containing a legume 
other than alfalfa. The alfalfa mixtures out yield-
ed other mixtures in every year, but alfalfa may 
not be adapted to all land in that region. In addi-
tion, some farmers may exclude alfalfa from con-
sideration bec~use of fear of bloat. Thus, less 
productive mixtures are also considered. 
. Three alfalfa mixtures are included and are 
identified as farmer alternatives in table A-26 of 
the appendix. The years covered by the data are 
1952-56. Each year is treated as a state of nature. 
Table A-27 of the appendix shows the regret ma-
trix for this problem. Table 17 indicates plans and 
outcomes for the. game theoretic criteria. 
The Laplace plan is to seed all pasture acres to 
alfalfa-orchardgrass. This plan may give the 
highest average pasture production over a period 
of years. Thus, it is appropriate for a farmer with 
a flexible livestock system. It is also appropriate 
for a farmer who ·must have the hi~hest possible 
security level every year. The securIty level (low-
est possible yield) is equal to that for the Wald 
criterion. 
The Wald solution shown in table 17 for the al-
falfa mixtures resulted from a technicality of the 
game theoretic procedure. Reference to table A-
26 shows that weather would theoretically never 
use its 1953, 1954 and 1955 strategies. When these 
columns are eliminated from the payoff matrix, it 
is seen that alfalfa-Kentucky bluegrass out yields 
alfalfa-orchard grass in the remaining payoff ma-
trix. Thus, only alfalfa-Kentucky bluegrass and 
alfalfa-bromegrass remain as farmer alternatives. 
The result is a Wald solution which may be either 
pure or mixed for the same security level. That 
is, a security level of 2.5 tons per acre may be ob-
tained by using all alfalfa-Kentucky bluegrass or 
by using a combination including 60 percent al-






Wald ................................ Mixed 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
S .. vnge reltret .................... Mixed 




















































falia-Kentucky bluegrass and 40 percent alfalfa-
smooth promegrass. The mixed strategy is shown 
in table 17. This particular circumstance indicates 
the importance of analyzing data rather than fol-
lowing purely mechanical steps alone. 
CHOICE OF NON-ALFALFA PASTURE MIXTURES IN 
SOUTHWEST IOWA 
The plans suggested for using other pasture 
mixtures are presented in table 18. The payoff 
matrix and the regret matrix are found in tables 
A-28 and A-29, respectively, of the appendix. Both 
the maximum security level and the highest aver-
age are obtained by use of a trefoil-Kentucky blue-
grass mixture. Thus, this mixture might be rec-
ommended with confidence. Orchardgrass-Ladino 
might be used by a farmer who is willing to gam-
ble on the highest yield possible. In this case, the 
Hurwicz criterion, which suggests the orchard-
grass-trefoil mixture, allows the same security 
level as the Wald and the Laplace criteria. The 
Savage regret mixed strategy allows the lowest 
regret possible but has other disadvantages. Ta-
bles 17 and 18 illustrate that differences may be 
slight in the possible outcome of the various game 
criteria. In such instances, a single recommenda-
tion is sufficient for a broad range of decision-
making settings on farms. 
CHOICE OF PASTURE STOCKING RATES 
A complex problem which farmers must face is 
deciding how many animals to have for a given 
pasture acreage. Normally, the decision must be 
made before the farmer knows how much forage 
will be produced. 
Heady et al.22 conducted a survey in Iowa to de-
termine what adjustments farmers make in their 
plans for year-to-year pasture variation. Ninety-
one percent of the farmers said they either: (a) 
plan stocking rates on the basis of average pas-
ture production over a period of years; (b) plan 
stocking rates for poorer years or (c) plan for the 
better years and feed hay or rent additional pas-
ture to make up deficits in bad years. The other 
9 percent either adjust livestock numbers to pas-
ture conditions or feed grain. The latter measures 
are mostly actions of farmers who primarily graze 
stocker or feeder cattle on pasture. 
The five alternative courses of action mention-
ed in the preceding paragraph may be considered 
as possible farmer strategies in a game against 
nature. Actually, only the three most prevalent 
ones are considered in the following problems. 
Nature's alternatives are different kinds of years. 
These may be represented by various levels of pas-
ture production measured in animal units which 
1 acre will support in that year. Five pasture 
yield levels are considered here. The cattle sys-
tem considered is a beef cow-calf enterprise. Cows 
.. Heady, Earl 0., Olson, R. O. and Scholl, J. M. Economic efficiency 
in p .... ture production and improvement In southern Iowa. Iowa Agr. 
Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 419. December 1954. 
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are bred to calve early in the spring. Calves are 
sold in October as good-to-choice feeder calves 
weighing 400 pounds. 
Two sets of pasture data are used for the analy-
sis. Both are from experiments at the Grundy-
Shelby Experimental Farm in Ringgold County, 
Iowa, during 1951-57. Table A-30 of the appendix 
shows the farmer-nature payoff matrix for un-
improved Kentucky bluegrass pasture. Table A-31 
of the appendix contains the regret matrix for 
- this problem. Tables A-32 and A-33 of the ap-
pendix show the payoff and regret matrices for 
Kentucky bluegrass pasture which has had an ap-
plication of superphosphate and is overseeded 
with lespedeza. 
In addition to pasture yield uncertainty, the 
farmer is confronted with price uncertainty. He 
does not know what the price of calves will be, and 
he does not know what the price of feed will be if 
he is forced to supplement the pasture. Price un-
certainty also is accounted for in the problem ma-
trices. Three possible price situations are hypoth-
esized. One is that prices will be like 1953 prices, 
when hay was relatively expensive in comparison 
to feeder calf prices. The second is that prices will 
be like those in 1956 when hay was cheaper com-
pared with feeder prices than in 1953. Iil the 
third price situation, the hay and feeder calf 
prices used are the average of 1948-57. Manyoth-
er price situations could have been considered, At 
the price levels considered, however, only drastic 
changes in relative prices would change the plans 
selected. Such changes would cause shifts in the 
relative amounts of each alternative entering a 
mixed strategy plan. All combinations of prices 
and pasture levels make up the possible states of 
nature. 
The entries in the payoff matrices are per-acre 
returns. These were computed by determining the 
value of beef which could be produced by stocking 
at the rates implied by the farmer alternatives. 
Rates of gain were obtained from the experi-
mental data. Only the gains of the calves are 
valued. The cost of hay used to make up pasture 
deficits is subtracted from the value of total gains. 
A pasture period of 153 days (May 15 to Oct. 15) 
is used. For simplicity, it is assumed that alfalfa 
hay is fed to make up deficits. Value of gains fore-
gone in good years is also subtracted from the 
value of beef produced. For example, if a farmer 
stocks "for 0.22 animal unit days per acre and gets 
0.44, he has an excess carrying capacity of 0.22 
animal units per acre. This excess, multiplied by 
grazing days times daily rate of gain, gives the 
pounds of gain foregone. This is easily valued by 
multiplying by" the price of feeder calves. The 
value of gain remaining after subtracting costs of 
hay and gain foregone is the payoff. 
Table 19 gives the strategies and outcomes sug-
gested by alternative decision criteria applied to 
the unimproved Kentucky bluegrass data. A farm-
er who can plan for the long run may follow the 
Laplace. solution. This calls for stocking for the 
next-to-best year. The Hurwicz criterion with 
o <; 0:: <; 0.77 calls for the same plan. Yearly re-
turns may range from $7.46 to $31.07 but should 
TABLE 18. STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY DECISION CRITERIA APPLIED TO SOIL CONSERVATION FARM PASTURE 
PROBLEM (NON-ALFALFA MIXTURES).' 
Decision mcdzl Strategy Possible outcome 
Type of 
strategy 
Percent Min. Av. Max. Max. regret 
Criterion Pasture mixture of land tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. 
Kentucky bluegrass_ 
100 trefoil 
Wald .................................. Pure 
1.0 1.5 2.3 0.9 
Kentucky bluegrass-
trefoil 100 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
1.0 1.5 2.3 0.9 
Kentucky bluegrass-
trefoil 16 
Savage regrct .................... Mixed 
Orchardgrass-trefoil 40 
Orchardgrass-Ladino 44 
100 0.78 1.3 1.9 0.61 
Hurwicz .... __ .... __ .... __ ............ Pure 
Orchardgrass-trefoil 100 1.0 1.4 2.4 0.9 
• See the footnotes of table 3 for an explanation of this table. 
TABLE 19. STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES SUGGESTED BY DECISION CRITERIA APPLIED TO GRUNDY-SHELBY UNIMPROVED 
KENTUCKY BLUEGRASS PASTURE DATA.-





















Loplace ... : .......................... Pure 
Sava!.", regret.. .................. Mixed 
Hurwicz .............................. Pure 
0:::: 0:: :::: 0.77 





A verage year 
• See the footnotes of table 3 for an explanation of this table. 
average $19.43. This plan also has a low regret. 
A farmer who must plan with short-run out-
comes in mind may use a combination of stocking 
rates. He may stock 88 percent of his pasture for 
averag.a yields and 12 percent for the worst pos-
sible year. This plan assures the farmer of at 
least $8.65 per acre every year, but his average 
income over the long run may be only $13.38. In 
some years, he would miss the opportunity to ob-
tain another $15.76 (regret). 
Plans for intermediate problem settings are 
given by the Savage regret criterion and Hurwicz 
criterion with 0.77 <: ex: <; 1. The Savage plan is 







8.65 13.38 22.81 15.76 
7.40 19.43 31.07 2.88 
7.69 18.17 28.63 2.66 
7.46 19.43 31.07 2.88 
8.42 14.70 25.36 13.20 
tive than one using the Laplace solution. The 
Hurwicz plan calls for stocking for average pas-
ture. It requires only a slight reduction in secu-
rity level and gives a sizable gain in long-run 
expecta tions. 
These results do not tell a farmer exactly what 
stocking rates he should use. They do present him 
with alternatives and possible consequences of 
using them. He might then choose the plan which 
best suits his situation. It should be remembered 
that many other plans could be devised. The ones 
presented here are those suggested by decision 
models which have been advanced for use in 
decision-making under uncertainty. 
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l'ABLE 20. STRATEGIES AND OUTCOJl1ES SUGGESTED BY DECISION CRITERIA APPLIED TO GRUNDY-SHELBY PHOSPHAT!,;· 
LESPEDEZA PASTURE DATA." 
Decision model Strategy Possible outcome 
Type of 
strategy 
Farmer Percent Min. Av. Max. Max. regret 
Criterion alternative of land 
\Vald ................................ Mixed. 
Laplace .............................. Pure 
Savage regret .................. Mixed 
Hurwicz __ ... ~ ... _.". _____ . __________ .Pure 
0:::; '" :::; 0.9 
0.9:::; 0:: :::; 1 
Worst year 






• See the footnotes of table 3 for an explanation of this table. 
Why do so many Iowa farmers stock for the 
worst possible year? This plan was not suggested 
as a pure strategy by any of the decision criteria 
used in table 19. Perhaps one reason is that farm-
ers do not evaluate the opportunity cost of unused 
pasture. Another possibility is that the goals im-
plied by the decision models used are not actually 
those of farmers. Farmers may use other deci-
sion models which suggest very conservative plans. 
All of these tentative hypotheses might be tested. 
The result of such testing might lead to develop-
ment of different decision models or verification 
of the appropriateness of those available. 
One reason for the results obtained may be the 
price situation and feeding technique assumed. It 
is profitable to convert hay to beef in each price 
situation considered. Thus, the heavier stocking 
rates tend to be most profitable. Cattle may gain 
at a lower rate when hay makes up a large part of 
the feed supply. This would reduce the profita-
bility of heavier stocking rates. These factors 
should be considered when using the analysis to 
make direct recommendations to farmers. The 











$/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
19.49 24.78 31.65 9.05 
18.87 28.83 40.71 1.45 
18.55 28.26 39.45 1.36 
18.87 28.83 40.71 1.45 
19.45 26.05 35.39 8.60 
of demonstrating the usefulness of game theoretic 
criteria for making decisions on pasture stocking 
rates. 
Tables A-32 and A-33 indicate that yields of 
phosphate-lespedeza-bluegrass pasture are consid-
erably higher than those for unimproved blue-
grass pasture. Table 20 shows the strategies and 
outcomes for phosphate-lespedeza-bluegrass pas-
ture. If a farmer wants the highest average long-
run returns, he might stock for the next-to-best 
year. This stocking rate strategy has the highest 
average of any strategy considered. The outcomes 
for this plan are shown in table 20 by the Laplace 
solution row. The highest possible security level 
is obtained by stocking 43 percent of the pasture 
for the worst year and 57 percent for the next-to.; 
best year. This is an appropriate plan for a farm-
er who must be assured the highest possible in-
come every year. Even though a given farmer 
wants to minimize regret, he is not likely to fol-
low the Savage plan. It offers little reduction in 
regret as compared with the Laplace plan. The 
security level and long-run average are both re-
duced by using the Savage regret solution. 
APPENDIX 





Bonham ........................................ 42 
Cherokee ........................................ 46 
Clintland ...................................... 44 
Clinton ................... _...................... 40 
Clarion .......................................... 50 
Sauk .............................................. 52" 

















- Source of data: Iowa State University, Seymour-Shelby Experimentsl 
Farm. Annual progress report, 1952 through 1957. (Mimeo.) Depart-
ment of Agronomy. Iowa State University, Ames. Iowa. 1953 through 
1958. 
b No oats were harvested on the Seymour-Shelby farm in 1956 because 
of drouth. Thus, yields in that year were the same for each variety and 
are not considered in the analysis. The all-zero yields would not affect 
plans. given that oats are to be grown. They would affect plans. 
however. if the problem is choosing between two crops such as barley 
and oats. 
TABLE A-2. PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE FARMER-NATURE. 




Bonham ...................... 53 
Cherokee ...................... 53 
Clintland .................... 49 
Clarion ........................ 67 
Sauk ............................ 63 
state of nature (year) 


























• Source of data: Iowa State University. Western Iowa Experimental 
Farm. Annual progress report. 1951 through 1957. (Mlmeo.) Depart-
ment of Agronomy. Iowa State University. Ames. Iowa. 1952 through 
1958. 





Bonham .......................................... -10 
Cherokee ........................................ -6 
Clintland ........................................ -8 
Clinton .......................................... -12 
Clarion .......................................... -2 
Sauk .............................................. 0 

















TABLE A-4. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR WESTERN IOWA 
OAT-VARIETY PROBLEM. 
Farmer State of nature (year) 
alternative -:;-19n.5"3;---'I;;;9;i5~4=:...::::.;1:.;9~5~5 ~!.!!:::1~95~6;;---,.,19;:-:5:-;7;-
(variety) bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
Bonham ........................ 14 -21 20 -4 -1 
Cherokee ...................... -14 -12 -26 0 -6 
CllnUand ...................... -18 -21 -11 -9 0 
Clarion .......................... 0 -6 -12 -8 -9 
Sauk .............................. -4 0 0 -11 -2 
TABLE A-5. FARMER-NATURE PAYOFF MATRIX FOR WESTERN 




Plains .......................... 38 
Mars ............................ 41 
State of nature (year) 














" Source of data: Iowa State University. Western Iowa Experimental 
Farm. Annual progress report. 1951 throUgh 1957. (Mimeo.) Depart-
ment of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1962 through 
1958. 





Plains .......... _.............. ..3 
Mars ............................ 0 
state of nature (year) 














TABLE A·7. FARMER-NATURE PAYOFF MATRIX FOR NORTH-




Pioneer 347 .................. 118 
Pioneer 371 .................. 122 
Pioneer 352 .................. 121 
Pioneer 349.................. 122 
P.A.G. 277 .................. 117 
state of nature (Year) 


























" Source of data: Iowa corn yield test, 1951 through 1957. Iowa Agl'. 
and Home Econ. Exp. Sta. and CooP. Ext Serv. Bulletins P-112. 115, 
116. 118. 120, 123 and 124. 1952 through 1958. 
TABLE A-S. FARMER-NATURE REGRET MATRIX FOR NORTH. 




Pioneer 347.................. -4 
Pioneer 371.................. 0 
Pioneer 352.................. -1 
Pioneer 349.................. 0 
P.A.G. 277.................... -5 
State of nature (year) 
1954 1955 1956 
bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
-3 .. 6 -6 
-4 0 -8 
0 -6 -11 
-6 -7 -3 








TABLE A.9. FARMER-NATURE PAYOFF MATRIX FOR SOUTHERN 




Pioneer 301b ........ 110 
P.A.G. 170 .......... 112 
U.S. 13 ................ 108 
P.A.G. 381 .......... 113 
Pioneer 300 .......... 110 
Maygold 47 .......... 115 
Maygold 59a. ....... 112 
Iowa 4565 ............ 118 












State of nature (year) 
1954 1955 1956 
bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
88 78 84 
79 76 91 
75 75 87 
79 77 85 
73 77 86 
69 73 85 
72 69 84 
79 73 78 












• Source of data: Iowa corn yield test, 1951 through 1957. Iowa Agr. 
and Home Econ. Exp. sta. and Coop. Ext. Serv. Bulletins P-l12. 115. 
116. 118. 120. 123 and 124. 1952 through 1958. 
TABLE A-IO. FARMER-NATURE REGRET MATRIX FOR SOUTHERN 
IOWA CORN-VARIETY PROBLEM. . 
Farmer State of nature (year) 
alternative -;1;;;9 .. 5'l;2---;1;;9 .. 5'";;3--=~1F.9;;;5"'i4:....;.;=::1~9f;5:;:5,::..:::=,1;-:9~5"'6:---1;-:9::;5"'7;-
(variety) bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. bu./a. 
Pioneer 301b.......... -8 -3 0 0 -7 0 
P.A.G. 170............ _6 0 -9 -2 0 -10 
U.S. 13 .................. -10 -4 -13 -3 -4 -4 
P.A.G. 381............ -5 -15 . -9 -1 -6 -8 
Pioneer 300............8 -4 -15 -1 -5 -6 
Maygold 47............ -3 -9 -19 -5 -6 -4 
Maygold 59a.......... -6 -6 -16 -9 -7 -4 
Iowa 4565 ............ 0 -8 -9 -5 -13 -11 
P.A.G. 283............ -7 -8 -5 -3 -7 -14 
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TABLE A-II. PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE FARMER-NATURE. 
NORTHEAST IOWA. M-P-K PROBLEM (NO CHARGE FOR 
MANURE).' 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
alternative $/a. $/a. S/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
(Ck.) No Fertilizer .......... 26.98b 0 14.92 4.08 28.78 1.6.58 
(M) 6 tons manUre .......... 53.08 17.46 53.74 14.80 45.00 43.48 
(P) 30# p.O ................... 28.00 4.64 -0.78 5.30 13.18 18.60 
(K) 30# K.O .................... 36.06 -0.71 27.89 1.76 35.58 32.26 
(PK) 30# K.O 
30# p.O ................... 33.63 5.70 32.11 9.40 35.34 33.72 
(MP) 6 tons manUre 
30# P.O ................. (MK) 6 tons manure 
64.84 23.61 49.36 10.98 43.94 38.05 
30# K,O .................... 50.95 18.46 16.48 9.72 48.48 42.88 
(MPK) 6 tons manure 
30# K,O 
30# p.O ................... 53.94 21.54 51.94 6.34 38.92 37.31 
• Source of data: Iowa State University. Howard County Experimental 
Farm. Annual progress report. 1951 through 1957. (Mimeo.) Depart-
ment of Agronomy. Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1952 through 
1958. 
b The returns-per-acre payoffs only reflect the part of. per-acre returns 
which are Influenced by states of nature or fertilizer practices. This was 
achieved by subtracting the lowest yield In the "no fertilizer" row of 
the data from all other entries In the yield matrix. This left the portion 
of yields which varies with years or fertilizer practices. These yield. were 
converted to dollar returns from which fertilizer cost... application costs 
and other costs which vary with additional yields were subtracted. This 
is a partiai budgeting technique which simplifles the analysis. The corn 
price used was $1.10. Costs of fertilizer nutrients were: (a) nitrogen, 
$0.13 per pound; (b) potassium. $0.05 Per pound; and (c) phosphorus. 
$0.10 per pound. A cost of $0.15 per bushel was computed for harvest-
ing. hauling and storing corn. Source of price data: U. S. Dept. Agr .. 
AgricultUral Marketing Service. AgricultUral prices. Issues 1947 
through 1958. 
TABLE A-12. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR NORTHEAST IOWA. 
M-P-K PROBLEM (NO CHARGE FOR MANURE). 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
alternative $/a. S/a. $/a. ·S/a. $/a. $/a. 
Ck .................................. -37.86 -23.61 -38.32 -10.72. -19.70 -26.90 
M .................................... -11.76 -6.15 0 0 -3.48 0 
P ................................... _ -36.84 -18.97 -54.02 -9.50 -35.30 -24.88 
K .................................... -28.78 -24.32 -25.35 -13.04 -12.90 -11.22 
PK .................................. -31.21 -17.91 -21.13 -5.40 -13.14 -9.7.6 
MP .................................. 0 0 -3.88 -3.82 -4.54 -5.43 
MK .................................. -13.89 -5.15 -36.76 -6.08 0 -0.60 
MPK ................................ -10.90 -2.07 -1.30 -8.46 -9.56 -6.17 
TABLE A-13. PAYOFF MATRIX FOR FARMER-NATURE M-P-K 
PROBLEM IN NORTHEAST IOWA (CHARGE FOR MANURE). 
Farmer 1952 
alternative $/a. 
Ck .................................... 2.6.98 
M ...................................... 39.88 
P ...................... _ ............... 28.00 
K ...................................... 36.06 
PK .................................... 33.63 
MP .................................... 51 .. 64 
MK .................................. 37.73 
MPK ................................ 40.74 
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State of nature (year) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
$/a. S/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
o 14.92 4.08 28.78 24.70 
4.26 40.54 1.60 31.80 30.28 
4.64 -0.78 5.30 13.18 18.60 
-0.71 27.89 1.76 35.58 32.26 
5.70 32.11 9.40 35.34 33.72 
10.41 36.16 ~2.22 30.74 24.85 
5.26 33.28 -3.48 35.28 29.68 
8.34 38.74 -6.86 25.72 24.11 
TABLE A-H. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR FARMER-NATURE 
M-P-K PROBLEM IN NORTHEAST IOWA (CHARGE FOR MA-
NURE). 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
alternative $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
Ck ................................... -24.66 10.41 -25.62 5.32 6.80 -9.02 
M .................................... -11.76 -6.15 0 -7.80 -3.78 -3.44 
P .................................... -23.64 -5.77 -41.32 -4.10 -22.40 -15.12 
K .................................... -15.58 -11.12 -12 .. 65 -7.£01 0 -1.46 
PK .................................. -18.01 -4.71 -8.43 0 -0.24 0 
MP .................... _............. 0 0 -4.38 -11.62 -4.84 -8.87 
MK .................................. -13.91 -5.15 -7.26 -12.88 -0.30 -4.04 
MPK ................................ -10.90 -2.07 -1.80 -16.26 -9.86 -9.61 
TABLE A-15. PAYOFF MATRIX FOR FARMER-NATURE M-P-K 




Ck. .................................... 0 
M ...................................... 47.38 
P ...................................... -0.97 
K ...................................... 10.70 
PK .................................... 23.66 
MP .................................. 46.32 
MK .......................... _ ......... 43.35 
MPK ................................ 44.24 



















































• Source of data: Iowa State University. Carrington-Clyde Experimen-
tal Farm. Annual progress report, 1952 through 1957. (Mimeo.) De-
partment of Agronomy. Iowa State University. Ames. Iowa. 1953 
through 1958. 
TABLE A-16. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR NORTHEAST-
CENTRAL IOWA M-P-K PROBLEM (NO CHARGE FOR MANURE). 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
alternative $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
Ck ................................... -47.38 -33.13 -30.38 -21.83 -13.16 -40.71 
M .................................... 0 -0.57 0 0 -6.25 -9.58 
P .................................... -48.35 -36.86 -22.70 -29.92 -13.18 -38.36 
K .................................... -36.68 -40.77 -40.67 -22.16 -24.79 -48.92 
PK .................................. -23.72 -29.80 -9.66 -13.94 -10.96 -14.68 
MP ...................... _........... -1.06 -1.44 -1.92 -4.58 0 0 
MK .................................. -4.03 -1.94 -4.12 -2.90 -4.39 -12.56 
MPK ................................ -3.14 0 -4.66 -6.75 -0.74 -8.24 
TABLE A-17. PAYOFF MATRIX FOR FARMER-NATURE M-P-K 




Ck ..................................... 0 
M .......... _ ........................... 34.18 
P ...................................... -0.97 
K ...................................... 10.70 
PK .................................... 23.6.6 
MP .................................. 33.12 
MK .................................. 30.15 
MPK ................................ 31.04 
State of nature (year) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
$/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
26.03 40.56 8.93 10.64 31.73 
45.39 57.74 17.56 4.35 49.66 
22.30 48.24 0.84 10.62 34.08 
18.39 30.27 8.60 -0.99 23.52 
29.36 61.28 16.82 12.84 57.76 
44.52 55.82 12.98 10.60 59.24 
44.02 53.62 14.66 6.21 46.68 
45.96 53.08 10.81 9.86 51.00 
TABLE A-18. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR NORTHEAST-CEN-
TRAL IOWA M-P-K PROBLEM (CHARGE FOR MANURE). 
State of nature ( Year) 
Farmer 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
alternative $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
Ok ................................... -34.18 -19.93 -20.72 -8.63 -2.20 -27.51 
M .................................... 0 -0.57 -3.54 0 -8.49 -9.58 
P .................................... -35.15 -23.66 -13.04 -16.72 -2.22 -25.16 
K .................................... -23.48 -27.57 -31.01 -8.96 -13.83 -35.72 
PK _ ................................. -10.52 -16.60 0 -0.74 0 -1.48 
MP ........................ _......... -1.06 -1.44 -5.46 -4.58 -2.24 0 
MK .. c............................... -4.03 -1.94 -7.66 -2.90 -6.63 -12.56 
MPK ................................ -3.14 0 -8.20 -6.75 -2.98 -8.24 
TABLE A-19. DATA AND REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR THE NITROGEN-STAND-VARIETY EXPERIMENT ON THE SEYMOUR-SHELBY 
EXPERIMENTAL FARM." 
Early variety - Iowa 4297 Adapted variety - A.E.S. 801 
Lb •• N Plant. 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
per a. per a. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. bu. 
0 8,000 55.2 26.6 26.6 50.5 47.3 52.5 21.9 24.4 49.8 55.7 
l~,OOO 56.9 8.1 23.3 56.8 50.3 47.2 9.1 13.2 60.3 52.1 
16,000 54.2 6.6 11.3 63.9 58.4 43.6 3.2 3.4 65.7 64.7 
20,000 43.4 3.7 10.3 53.0 55.2 38.0 2.6 2.4 64.1 61.5 
80 8,000 59.5 28.2 30.0 55.5 58.4 53.0 21.5 23.4 53.6 66.2 
12.000 60.9 11.9 24.5 58.3 66.2 54.3 9.2 13.7 59.0 70.9 
16,000 71.1 6.5 18.0 71.1 81.6 58.0 3.8 8.8 71.6 89.8 
30,000 58.8 3.0 11.0 63.4 83.5 44.1 3.5 6.6 70.7 86.6 
160 8,000 63.8 19 .. 6 41.4 48.2 54.9 58.0 18.0 30.0 48.8 65.5 
12,000 65.5 13.0 27.5 54.0 69.2 61.8 11.6 20.0 57.6 69.1 
16,000 67.9 5.5 16.7 61.1 83.2 59.8 7.9 6.7 68.9 96.9 
20,000 66.4 5.2 9.8 56.3 88.4 55.5 4.1 4.2 60.7 88.4 
Regre.sion equation for the early variety:b 
Y = -144.8603 + 0.5268X, - 0.0639X,' + 35.3228X. - 1.5640X,' - 0.1063X,X: + 0.01l4X,X.X.; R' = 0.69; d.f. == 53 (1.3) (1.03) 
Regression equation for the adapted variety: 
(4.35) (3.6) (1.4) (1.6) 
Y = -149.7796 + 1.1635X, - 0.0421X,· + 34.1749X, - 1.4083X.' - 0.1059X,X. + 0.01l5X,X.X.; R' = 0.79 (1.09) (0.75) (4.6) (3.6) (1.5) (1.7) 
X, = nitrogen; X. == stand; X. == current year rainfall [June rainfall (:;0; 4 inche~) + July rainfall (:;0; 5 inche.) + August rainfall « 6 in-
ches)] + carryover (previous year rainfall - 21 Inches) • 
• Source of data: Iowa State University. Seymour-Shelby Experimental Farm. Annual progress report, 1952 through 1957. (Mimeo.) Department 
of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1953 through 1958. United States Weather Bureau. IOwa Weather and Crop Service. Climato-
logical data. Des Moines, Iowa. 1925 through 1957. 
b The t'. for each b appear in parentheses below coefficients. 
TABLE A-20. PAYOFF MATRIX FOR FARMER-NATURE 
NITROGEN-STAND-VARIETY PROBLEM.' 
Weather (ramfall m mche.) 
Farmer alternative 6 In. 8 in. 10 in. 12 in. 
$/a. S/a. $/a. $/0.. 
Early variety, stand - 12,000, N - 0........ 9.25b 35.84 50.85 52.28 
Adapted variety, stand:= 12,000, N = 0.... 3.05 31.87 49.62 56.00 
Adapted variety, stand = 12,000, N ::: 10.. 2.32 31.41 49.44 56.10 
Adapted variety, stand::: 12,000, N = 20.. 1.67 31.10 49.41 56.34 
Adapted variety. stand == 12,000, N = 40.. 0.31 :lO.23 49.09 56.58 
Adapted variety, stand = 16,000, N::: 40 .. -0.78 29.51 48.73 56.59 
Adapted variety, stand· = 16,000, N:= 60 .. -2.85 28.18 48.14 56.7:1 
Adapted variety, stand = 20,000, N = 60 .. -4.24 27.93 47.85 56.99 
" Source of data: Iowa State University. Seymour-Shelhy E.",Jerimentlll 
Farm. Annual progress report, 1952 through 1957. (Mimeo.) Depart-
ment of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1953 through 
1958. 
b Returns shown equal bushels times $0.95 a bu.hel for corn, less seed 
and fertilizer costs. Fertilizer costs include application expenses. Corn 
price used is $1.10 minus $0.15 per bushel for harvesting, hauling and 
etorage costs. 
TABLE A-21. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR FARMER-NATURE 
NITROGEN-STAND-VARIETY PROBLEM. 
Rainfall 
Farmer alternative 6 in. 12 in. 
$/a. $10.. 
Early variety, stand - 12,000, N - 0.......................... .0 -4.71 
Adapted variety, stand = 12,000, N == 0 ........... ".......... -6.20 -0.99 
Adapted variety, stalld = 12,000, N = 10.................... -6.93 -0.89 
Adapted variety, stand = 12,000, N == 20 ................... _ -7.58 -0.65 
Adapted variety, stand == 12,000, N::: 40.................... -8.94 -0.41 
Adapted variety, stand = 16,000, N = 40 .................... -10.03 -0.40 
Adapted variety, stand = 16,000, N = 60 .................... -12.10 -0.26 
Adapted variety, stand == 20,000, N::: 60 .................... -13.49 0 
TABLE A-22. PAYOFF MATRIX FOR FARMER-NATURE CROP 
ENTERPRISE SELECTION PROBLEM." 
Farmer altgrnath'e 1953 
$/a. 
S"uk oats ................................ 2Gb 
Clintland oats ........................ 33 
Plains barley .......................... 30 




























• Source of data: Iowa State University. Western Iowa Experimental 
Farm. Annual progre.s report, 1951 through 1957. (Mlmeo.) Depart-
rgeSt of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1952 through 
b Payoffs are the gross value of the production from 1 aere. The oat 
~~~'j,~I~.ed was $0.53 per bushel, and the barley price was $0.80 per 
TABLE A-23. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR THE CROP-
ENTERPRISE SELECTION PROBLEM. 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer alternative 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. $/a. 
Sauk oat ................................. -7 -16 
-6 -9 0 
Clintland oats ........................ 0 -5 0 -10 -15 
Plains barley_ ......................... -3 0 -4 0 -14 
Cherokee oat ........................... -5 -11 -14 -4 -11 
TABLE A-24. PAYOFF MATRIX FOR FARMER-NATURE PASTURE 
MIXTURE PROBLEM IN HOWARD COUNTY." 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer alternative 1954 1955 1956 1957 
tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. 
Alfalfa-bromegrass ................... _ .... 2.0b 
Trefoil-bromegrass .......................... 1. 7 
Ladino-Kentucky bluegrass ............ 3.4 
Ladino-orchordgrass ...................... 3.2 
















• Source of data: Iowa State University. Howard County E."'<perimental 
Farm. Annual progress report, 1951 through 1957. (Mimeo.) Depart-
rgefii. of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1952 through 
b Yields are in tons of weed-free dry matter per acre per year. These 
may be converted to pound. of T.D.N. by multiplying 1.14 x tons per 
acre x percent T.D.N. for the pasture. The factor, 1.14, converts yields 
to pounds of 12-percent moisture hay. 
TABLE A-25. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR HOWARD COUNTY 
PASTURE MIXTURE PROBLEM. 
Farmer alternative 1954 
tons/a. 
Alfalfa-bromegrass ........................ -1. 4 
Trefoil-bromegrass ........................ -1.7 
Ladino-Kentucky bluegrass ..... _.... 0 
Ladino-orchardgra ........................ -0.2 
Alfalfa-timothy .............................. -1.5 
State of nature (year) 
1955 1956 














TABLE A-26. FARMER-NATURE PAYOFF MATRIX FOR SOIL 
CONSERVATION FARM, ALFALFA-GRASS PASTURE PROBLEM.-
State of nature (year) 
Fanner alternative 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
ton./a. tons/a. tons/a, tons/a. tons/a. 
Alfalfa-Kentucky bluegrass ........ 2.5b 4.1 4.3 4.3 2.7 
Alfalfa-smooth bromegrass .......... 2.5 4.2 4.5 3.7 2.2 
Alfalfa-orchardgrass .................... 2.5 4.3 4.6 4.4 2 •. 6 
• Source of data: Iowa State University. Soil Conservation Experimen-
tal Farm. Annual progress report, 1952 through 1957. (Mimeo.) De-
partment of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1953 
through 1958. 
b Yield. of pasture In tons of weed-free dry matter Per acre per year. 
TABLE A-27. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR SOIL CONSERVA-
TION FARM, ALFALFA-GRASS PASTURE PROBLEM. 
Farmer alternative 
State of nature (year) 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
ton./a. tons/a. tons/a, tons/a. tons/a. 
Alfalfa-Kentucky bluegrass ........ 0 -0,2 -0.3 -0.1 0 
Alfalfa-smooth bromegrass .......... 0 -0.1 -0.1 -0,7 -0.5 
Alfalfa-orchardgrass .................... 0 0 0 0 -0.1 
TABLE A-28. FARMER-NATURE PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE SOIL 
CONSERVATION FARM, NON-ALFALFA LEGUME-GRASS 
PASTURE PROBLEM.-
Farmer alternative 
Trefoil-Kentucky bluegrass ...... .. 
Trefoil-smooth bromegrass ........ .. 
Trefoil-orchardgra.. .. ................ .. 
Ladino-orchardgrass .................. .. 
State of nature (year) 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
tons/a. tons/a. ton./a. ton./a. tons/a. 
LOb 2.3 2.0 1.1 1.0 
0.7 2.1 2.2 1,0 1.1 
1.0 1,8 2.4 1.0 1.0 
1.9 1.6 1.4 0.6 0.5 
• Source of data: Iowa State University. Soil Conservation Experimen-
tal Farm. Annual progress report, 1952 through 1957. (Mimeo.) De-
partment of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1953 
through 1958. 
b Yields are in tons of weed-free dry matter per acre per year. 
TABLE A-29. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR THE SOIL CON-
SERVATION FARM, NON-ALFALFA PASTURE PROBLEM. 
State of nature (year) 
Farmer alternative 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. tons/a. tons/a, 
Trefoil-Kentucky bluegrass .......... -0.9 0 -0.4 0 -0.1 
Trefoil-smooth bromegrass ....... ' .. -1.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0 
Trefoil-orchardgrass .................... -0.9 -0.5 0 -0.1 -0.1 
Ladino-orchardgrass .................... 0 -0.7 -1.0 -0.5 -0.6 
TABLE A-30, FARMER-NATURE PASTURE STOCKING RATE PROBLEM FOR UNIMPROVED PASTURE IN GRUNDY-SHELBY SOIL AREA 
($/a.).· 
Cow and calf 
carrying capacity 
per acre Plan for aV, 
pasture -0.39 c 
0.23 
1953 prices ........ , .... " ......... , ................................................ . 
Av. pricesb ............................................................... , ........ .. 
1956 prices .............. " ... , .. , .. "., .. "." .................................... .. 
0.31 
1953 prices ........... ' ..... '''' .... ' .. ' ...... ' ................................... .. 
Av. price ........................................... ,',., ..... ,"',., .. , .. "., .. , ... .. 
1956 prices, ................................. " .................................. ' ... 
0.40 
1953 prices",., ................................................................... .. 
Av. price ............. ,"', .. , ...................................................... .. 
1956 prices ......................................................................... . 
0.47 
1953 prices ........................................ , ............................... .. 
Av. prices.",,"', ................................................................. .. 
195 6 price .......... ,., ... ,." ............................ , .... , ...... , ............. . 
0.55 
1953 prices ........................................................... , ............ .. 
Av. price ............................................................................ . 



































be.t year and 
















• Source of data: Heady, Earl 0., Olson, R. O. and Scholl, J. M. Economic efficiency in pasture production and improvement in southern Iowa. 
Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 419. December 1954. Iowa State University Grundy-Shelby Experimental Farm. Annual progress report, 1952 
through 1957. (Mimeo.) Department of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ame., Iowa. 1953 through 1958. McKee, D. E. Heady, E. O. and 
SchoU, J. M. Optimum allocation of resources between pasture Improvement and other opportunities on .outhern Iowa farms. iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. 
Res. Bul. 435. January 1956. 
b Average prices of hay and grain, 1948-57. 
• Stocking rate In animal units per acre. 
d Payoffs are returns per acre from the given stocking rate minus hay costs and value of gains foregone. 
TABLE A-31. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR UNIMPROVED PASTURE STOCKING RATE PROBLEM ($/a.). 




1953 prices .......................................................... _ ... _ ....... _ 
t9v5l~ii~~s:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
0.31 
1953 prices ......................................................................... . 
Av. prices .......................................................... _ ............... . 
1956 prices ........................................................................ .. 
0.40 
1953 price ......................................................................... .. 
Av. prices ....................... " ......................................... , ......... . 
195 6 price ......................................................................... " 
0.47 
1953 prices .......... , ............................................................. .. 
Av. prices ........................................................................... . 
195 6 prices ...................... , .............................. , ................... . 
0.55 
1953 prices ...................... , .... , ............................................ .. 
Av. prices .......................................................................... .. 
1956 priees .................................. , ..................................... .. 
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TABLE A·32.· FARMER.NATURE PASTURE STOCKING RATE PROBLEM }'OR PHOSPHATE·LESPEDEZA PASTURE IN THE GRUNDY. 
SHELBY SOIL AREA ($/a.).b 




1953 prices ........................................................................ .. 
A v. prices ........... u ••• __ •• ___ ••• ____ ••••••• ___ • ___ •• __ ••••••••••••••••• __ ••••••••• 
1956 prices ........................................................................ .. 
0.47 
] 953 prices ......................................................................... . 
Av. prices ............. _ .................... _ ..... _ .... ___ ......... ___ ............. __ . 
1956 pric,s ........................................................................ .. 
0.50 
1953 price ......................................................................... .. 
Av. prices ............................ __ ._, ............. ___ ......... __ ............ __ .. 
1956 prices ........................................................................ .. 
0.58 
1953 prices ........................................................................ .. 
Av. prices. _______ ............ H •••••• __ • __ • __ •••••••• _____ •• __ •••• ___ ••••••••• __ • ___ _ 
1956 prices ......................................................................... . 
0.62 
1953 prices ......................................................................... . 
Av. prices ........................................................................ .. 
1956 prices ......................................................................... . 

















• See footnotes in table A·30 for an explanation of this table. 
Farmer lliternatives 

















Plan for next-to. 
best year and 
















b Source of data: Iowa State University. Grundy.Shelby Experimental Farm. Annual progress report, 1952 through 1957. (Mimeo.) Department 
of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 1953 tbrough 1958. 
TABLE A·33. SAVAGE REGRET MATRIX FOR PHOSPHATE-LESPEDEZA-BLUEGRASS PASTURE STOCKING RATE PROBLEM ($/n.). 




19 53 prices ........................................................................ .. 
Av. prices ............ ___ ............. n •••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••• __ H.··._ .... . 
1956 prices ........................................................................ .. 
0.47 
1953 prices ........................................................................ .. 
A ·,r. prices ... __ ........ H. __ .......... __ ............................................. . 
1956 prices ........................................................................ .. 
0.50 
1953 1>l'i<es ........................................................................ .. 
A \-. prices ___ ........ __ ... u •••••••••• __ •••• __ .. ___ •••••••••••••••••••••••••• ___ •••••• 
1956 prices ........................................................................ .. 
0.58 
195:l prices ........................................................................ .. 
Av. prices ... __ ...................................................•. _ ................ . 
1956 prices ......................................................................... . 
O.G? 














1953 prices ........................................................................ .. ..0.G8 
-8.60 Av. prices ............ .: .............................................................. . 
1956 prices ....................................................................... . -6.46 
Farmer alternatives 

















Plan for next·to· 
best year -0.58 
-1.46 
o 
-0.45 
-0.57 
o 
-0.19 
-0.57 
o 
-0.18 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
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